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PENALIZING INSIDER TRADING: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF THE INSIDER TRADING
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984
CAROLE B. SILVER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (the "ITSA" or the
"Act") was adopted by Congress to give the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission") an additional weapon to
use in its battle against insider trading.' The new weapon provided by
the ITSA is a treble damages sanction, which the SEC may seek to im-
pose upon anyone found to have tipped or traded while in possession of
material nonpublic information in violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act").2 The authorization of a civil penalty rep-
resents a dramatic change in the approach taken by Congress to the se-
curities laws in general and to insider trading in particular.
Before enacting the ITSA, Congress had taken a neutral stance to-
wards insider trading from the perspective of civil enforcement. Under
the law as it existed prior to the adoption of the ITSA, the SEC could sue
to enjoin future violations of the insider trading laws, to require disgorge-
ment of any profits made from insider trading, or both.3 These enforce-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
J.D., Indiana University - Bloomington, B.A., University of Michigan. I would like to thank Lewis
M. Collens and Michael Hyatte for their comments on the first draft of this article, and Sheldon H.
Nahmod for his comments on a later version. I also would like to acknowledge the valuable assist-
ance of Rochelle Miller, John Walden and Kathleen Watts in researching this article, and of Virginia
C. Thomas for her aid in obtaining research material.
1. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (the
"ITSA" or the "Act"). See infira notes 42-54 and accompanying text for a general description of the
Act.
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(ll) (Supp. 11 1984) (hereinaf-
ter cited as "the 1934 Act"]; see SEC to Seek Expansion of Authority to Bring Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 267, 268 (1984) (reporting comment of John Fedders, then
Chief of Enforcement at the SEC, on the proposed ITSA: "Using fines has the advantage of making
it easier for the public 'to perceive the gravity of the violation,' Fedders said. However, imposing
fines would put the SEC in the 'role of a punisher,' abandoning its long-established position as a
'remedial' agency, [Fedders] added.").
3. An injunction may be sought by the Commission pursuant to section 21(d) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
Disgorgement may be ordered pursuant to the ancillary jurisdiction of a United States district
court hearing the SEC's petition for an injunction. See Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities
960
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ment options did not impose a penalty for insider trading, but merely
returned the defendant to the position he would have occupied had he
not engaged in the illegal trade. In addition to SEC enforcement actions,
the courts recognized implied private rights of action under sections
10(b) 4 and 14(e)5 and the corresponding regulations, Rules lOb-56 and
14e-3, 7 thereby permitting individuals injured by an illegal trade to sue
for compensatory damages.8 Finally, the Justice Department could
criminally prosecute a willful violation of section 10(b) or any other sec-
tion of the 1934 Act and seek to imprison the defendant, to fine him, or
both.9 Prior to the adoption of the ITSA, there was no statutory author-
ity in the securities laws for penalizing insider trading other than through
criminal prosecution. The new Act shifted the focus of civil enforcement
from compensation and disgorgement-both representing a relatively
Law: A Study in FederalRemedies, 67 MINN. L. REv. 865, 930-32 (1983); Farrand, Ancillary Reme-
dies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1800-05 (1976); Mathews, Recent
Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Reliefin SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323, 1327
(1976); Program of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions,
30 Bus. LAW. 1303, 1305-06 (1975); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1194-96 (1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
(recognizing existence of implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); see Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) V 92,591 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969) (recognizing private right of
action under section 14(e)).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985); see supra note 4.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985); see O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529
F. Supp. 1179, 1189-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff options trader could maintain action under Rule
14e-3 where corporate insiders tipped nonpublic information concerning unannounced tender offer).
8. On the measure of damages relevant in a private action under Rule lOb-5, see infra note
243.
9. The 1934 Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
The ITSA increased the monetary criminal penalty under section 32 to a maximum of
$100,000. ITSA § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 11 1984). In addition, section 32 authorizes a maxi-
mum prison sentence of five years. Either the fine or imprisonment, or both, may be ordered upon
conviction. See id.
In addition to criminal prosecution, the SEC has successfully sought the imposition of other
sanctions that could be characterized as "penal," such as suspension or revocation of a broker-
dealer's registration, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1982); see, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 107 (2d
Cir. 1967) (revocation); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.) (suspension), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); or barring a broker from association with a broker-dealer for a period of
time, see, e.g., In re Paul, 32 S.E.C. 936 (Feb. 26, 1985), reprinted in [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,748 (barring salesman from association with any broker or dealer for
two years after he was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns). See generally H. FRIED-
MAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 55-63 (1981). Pursuant to authority in the
Commission's Rule of Practice Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1985), the SEC has also barred
lawyers and accountants who violate the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), or the
1934 Act from practicing before the Commission. See generally Ferrara, Administrative Disciplinary
Proceedings Under Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAW. 1807 (1981); Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus.
LAW. 987 (1980) (discussing specific applications of Rule 2(e)).
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neutral approach to insider trading-to penalizing the prohibited
activity.
Thus, before the ITSA, an inside trader could only be penalized fol-
lowing criminal conviction for violation of the insider trading laws. As
with all criminal prosecutions, a prosecution for a violation of the insider
trading provisions of the securities laws is attended by all of the constitu-
tional safeguards afforded any criminal defendant. 10 For example, the
defendant has a right to a jury trial,1 and guilt must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 12 Moreover, the Justice Department, not the SEC, de-
cides which criminal cases to prosecute and conducts the litigation.' 3
Undoubtedly because of a combination of these factors, criminal prose-
cutions for insider trading have been rare.14
Under the new Act, in contrast, an inside trader can be penalized
under civil enforcement procedures. The SEC, not the Department of
Justice, is the plaintiff in an action under the ITSA, 15 and the defendant
is entitled only to the procedural protections available in any civil
lawsuit.16
This civil enforcement mechanism, without the full panoply of pro-
tections offered a criminal defendant, was exactly what Congress in-
tended in adopting the ITSA. 17 Both Congress 18 and the Commission 19
10. Because a violation of section 32 can lead to a term of imprisonment of five years, see supra
note 9, it is a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (defining what crimes constitute felonies).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
12. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1), (2) (Supp. 11 1984).
14. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House
Hearings] (statement of Rep. Bates) ("Only six people have ever been convicted on criminal charges
[of violating section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5], and one conviction was overturned."); see also insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-51 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1984 Senate Hearings] (letter from John M. Fedders, Director of the Enforcement Divi-
sion of the SEC) (synopsizing 22 cases in which criminal prosecutions were brought against inside
traders as of May 1984).
15. The ITSA provides that "the Commission may bring an action . . . to seek . . . a civil
penalty" when it believes that the insider trading prohibitions have been violated. ITSA § 3, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added); see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
16. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
17. Congress and the Commission perceived an increase in insider trading. See discussion infra
notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
18. In introducing the ITSA to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee, Representative Wirth, characterized its purpose as to "provide a sufficient deterrent so that
people will think twice before they engage in what all of us would call thievery." 1983 House Hear.
ings, supra note 14, at 2. On the issue of deterrence, see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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believed that the most effective way to combat insider trading was to
authorize the SEC to seek more severe sanctions in its enforcement ac-
tions. Obviously, the threat of a treble damages penalty is a more power-
ful deterrent than the threat of disgorgement, since the potential loss
from disgorgement merely returns the violator to his pre-violation finan-
cial position.20 Accordingly, Congress determined that a penalty in addi-
tion to disgorgement was necessary to deter insider trading.
Furthermore, the force of a deterrent is strongest when the likelihood of
detection and prosecution is greatest.21 Congress believed that criminal
safeguards and the involvement of the Department of Justice simply im-
peded enforcement efforts. It chose a civil sanction, instead of simply
increasing the criminal penalties, in order to avoid the necessity of in-
volving the Department of Justice. Moreover, civil procedural protec-
tions would permit the SEC to prosecute many more cases successfully
than would criminal safeguards. The cost of prosecuting criminal cases
is higher than that of civil actions,22 and the lower burden of proof appli-
cable in civil cases permits a greater number of successful prosecutions
than does the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal cases.
In enacting the ITSA, Congress provided the SEC with the strongest
weapon it could fashion within the constraints of existing case law defin-
ing insider trading.2 3
As a civil penalty, however, the ITSA has several significant defects.
First, it fails to define the prohibited conduct and instead relies on ex-
isting and developing case law to establish the boundaries of legitimate
activity.24 Because the case law under sections 10(b) and 14(e) is far
19. 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 17 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad).
20. "Mere removal of economic benefit will usually be insufficient by itself to secure compliance
with regulatory standards. It is necessary, at least in theory, to multiply the documented benefit by a
factor representing the likelihood of escaping punishment altogether." Diver, The Assessment and
Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435,
1467 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1980) ("It is assumed that, holding other factors constant, an increase in either the
probability of apprehending and punishing violators or in the magnitude of the applicable nominal
sanction will result in a decreased number of violations.") (footnotes omitted).
Of course, even when the SEC seeks only disgorgement, more is at stake for the defendant than
simply the amount of profit. The defendant will incur costs in defending the suit (such as attorney's
fees) and may suffer a loss of reputation or employment or both as a result of the enforcement action.
See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 60 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad).
21. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 268-69 (statement of Ted J. Filfis) (discussing deter-
rence value of the penalty).
22. The higher cost of a criminal prosecution results in part from the time required to select a
jury. But see infra notes 225-38 (discussing right to jury trial under ITSA).
23. The treble damages penalty might be even more effective as a deterrent if it were made
available as a sanction that the SEC could impose administratively. The Commission did not request
such authority, however. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 31-32.
24. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
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from clear or uniform,25 a defendant may lack notice of the illegality of
his conduct. This lack of notice raises concerns about due process and
the retroactive application of new rules of law.2 6 In addition, Congress
stated that the standard of proof in an action under the ITSA should be
the civil standard, "a preponderance of the evidence."' 27 That standard,
however, may not be appropriate in light of the size of the ITSA penalty
and the imprecision with which it defines the proscribed conduct. The
imposition of a penalty also seems to require guaranteeing to a defendant
the right to trial by jury, yet the Act is silent on this issue. Finally, the
sanction authorized by the ITSA is not exclusive but may be imposed in
addition to other remedies accorded the SEC or private litigants. Con-
gress did not indicate whether there was a maximum sanction that any
one defendant should suffer as a result of insider trading. These issues
will be discussed in the following sections, which analyze the provisions
of the Act.
After elaborating the troublesome features of the ITSA as a civil
penalty provision, the article considers whether the ITSA should have
been drafted as a criminal provision or could be judicially construed as
one. The treatment of the Act as a criminal statute, however, poses addi-
tional concerns, especially about the efficacy of regulating economic con-
duct through the criminal laws. The article concludes with guidelines for
courts and the Commission to use in applying the treble damages pen-
alty, aimed at remedying the problems underlying the ITSA as enacted.
These guidelines address when the Commission should invoke the
ITSA28 and how courts ought to determine the amount of the penalty
imposed under the Act;29 they also propose certain procedural protec-
tions, such as an intermediate standard of proof and the right to trial by
jury,30 that should be afforded defendants when the SEC seeks treble
damages under the Act.
II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ITSA
A. Adoption of the ITSA.
The SEC initiated consideration of the ITSA3M as part of its in-
25. See infra notes 97-140 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 157-89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 274-87 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 288-94 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
31. See letter from SEC Chairman Shad to House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Sept. 27,
1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-27 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2274, 2292-99 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. For a description
of the Act, see infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text; Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions
[Vol. 1985:960
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creased enforcement activity against insider trading.3 2 This increase in
enforcement was prompted by the Commission's belief that the opportu-
nities for gains from trading on the basis of material nonpublic informa-
tion have expanded in recent years. 33 The increased profitability of
insider trading arises from two trends in business and finance.
First, the recent spate of tender offers and other business combina-
tions34 has broadened the opportunities for gain from trading on the basis
of material nonpublic information. If a person knows of an impending
acquisition, he can reap huge profits by trading in the securities of the
company about to be acquired before the acquisition is publicly an-
nounced. 35 As acquisitions increase, so do opportunities to gain from
trading on the basis of knowledge of such acquisitions.
The second trend is the growth of the market for financial options
on securities. 36 Options trading may yield significant profits, while the
investor risks only the price of the option, usually a small fraction of the
price of the underlying securities.37 For this reason, trading in options is
more attractive than trading in securities for persons who do not want to
invest the aggregate price of the securities.38 The options market thus
Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1276-77 (1984); Note, A Cri-
tique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455 (1985).
32. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 18 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) ("In order to
curtail and deter insider trading, the Commission has sharply increased the number of enforcement
actions against such conduct."); see also id. at 21-22. The ITSA was intended by Congress only to
provide a new remedy; it was not intended to affect the substantive law of insider trading. See 1983
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 50.
33. See generally 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 16-27 (prepared statement of SEC
Chairman Shad).
34. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 11-12, 17 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad);
1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 19 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad); 130 CONG. REC.
H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth); see also Thomas, Insider Trading Revis-
ited: The SEC's New Initiatives, 1982-1983 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 435, 435 ("The current wave of
mergers and tender offers provides the green fertilizer that makes [insider trading] thrive.").
35. See, e.g., Bleiberg, Want a Hot Tip? There's No Way to Prevent Trading on Insider Informa-
tion, 61 BARRONS 7 (1981); Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, 104 FORTUNE 72-76
(1981).
36. See, eg., 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 17-19 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad)
(discussing adverse effects of insider trading in options on market makers and specialists); 130 CONG.
REC. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). See generally COMMODITY Fu-
TURFS TRADING COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES
TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL NONPUBLIC INFORMATION, summarized in 1984
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N ANN. REP. 60-64 [hereinafter cited as CTFC STUDY].
On April 16, 1985, the SEC agreed in principle to permit the trading of options on securities traded
in the over-the-counter market. See SEC Approves Multiple Trading of OTC Options by NASD,
Exchanges, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 647 (1985).
37. See generally GASTINEAU, THE STOCK OPTIONS MANUAL (2d ed. 1979).
38. However, pursuant to Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1985), and Regulation U, 12 C.F.R.
§ 221 (1985), many securities can be traded through use of a margin account, which requires only
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opens up the field to new players.39 Moreover, when material nonpublic
information is announced, the value of an option contract may increase
at a greater rate than the value of the underlying securities. 40 Thus, trad-
ing in options on inside information might yield greater gains more
quickly than trading in the underlying securities on the basis of that
information.
Two general concerns provided the incentive for the adoption of the
ITSA as the remedy for the insider trading problem. First, the SEC be-
lieved and persuaded Congress that the available sanctions were inade-
quate to provide sufficient deterrence against violations of the law
prohibiting insider trading.41 Prior to the adoption of the Act, the SEC
had two remedies available to it. It could seek an injunction against fu-
ture violations of the relevant statute or regulation, and it could require
the defendant to disgorge any profit realized or loss avoided by the illegal
trade.42 According to the SEC, these sanctions (and any other conse-
quences of a charge of insider trading) merely put the defendant back in
the position he would have occupied had he not violated the law in the
first place. 43 Any profits derived from the illegal trade would be paid
back, and the defendant would be formally prohibited from violating the
law in the future. In the Commission's view, then, one could not lose
from insider trading.44
50% of the current market value of the security to be maintained in the margin account for each
security held by such account. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18(a) (1985).
39. See CTFC STUDY, supra note 36, at 61-63 (discussing trading abuses unique to trading in
options and futures).
40. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 31, at 466 & n.77.
The greater gain on an option from the announcement of material information might occur as a
result of the new information increasing the uncertainty about the potential of the issuer. Increased
uncertainty will increase the value of an option because the potential gains are greater.
41. 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) ("[T]he
recent conjunction of tender offers and acquisitions with the availability of trading in standardized
options contracts . . . have fundamentally altered the risk-reward equation with respect to insider
trading and demonstrate the need for a new enforcement remedy to deter such conduct.").
42. See supra note 3.
43. The SEC has recognized that the consequences of a successful enforcement action may go
beyond disgorgement: "[I]t should be noted that defendants may also be subject to criminal prosecu.
tion by the Justice Department, imprisonment and criminal fines, civil suits by defrauded parties,
disbarment, license revocation, and other proceedings by professional and self-regulatory organiza-
tions, the loss of employment, legal fees, and social opprobria." 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14,
at 14 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad); see also 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 26-27, 60,
133, 238; Thomas, supra note 34, at 438 ("Indeed, when professionals [lawyers, accountants and
securities professionals] are involved, we're going to hit them where it hurts: their professional
standings."). The SEC can also use Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice to prohibit
professionals from appearing before the Commission. See supra note 9.
44. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 2; see also Diver, supra note 20, at 1463-64
(discussing use of penalties to deter illegal conduct); Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and
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The second major incentive for the adoption of the Act was Con-
gress's and the SEC's dissatisfaction with the substantive law governing
insider trading.45 In the early 1980's, the Supreme Court issued two sig-
nificant insider trading decisions.46 Both cases narrowly construed the
applicability of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to "outsiders"--persons
who were not officers, directors, or otherwise traditional insiders with
respect to the issuer of the traded securities-who traded on the basis of
material nonpublic information or tipped such information to one who
then traded in the security. In Chiarella v. United States47 and Dirks v.
SEC,48 the Court emphasized that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit
onlyfraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities and that
violations occur only when there has been a breach of duty amounting to
fraud.
Chiarella was an employee of a financial printer that was hired to
prepare the acquisition documents for five corporate takeover bids.49
Chiarella's employer was hired by the acquiring company in each of the
five transactions.50 Although the target company name was not dis-
closed in any of the five documents, Chiarella discovered the identities of
the targets from information contained in the bidder's documents and
bought stock in the targets before the tender offers were announced.51
When the acquisitions were announced to the public, the price of the
target stock rose, and Chiarella profited by selling his shares at the higher
market price.52 The Justice Department brought a criminal action
against Chiarella for violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.5 3
The Supreme Court held that Chiarella's actions should be consid-
ered fraudulent only if the government could show that he was under a
duty not to use the information for his personal gain while it was unavail-
able to the public.54 The Court held that such a duty to refrain from
Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896,
934 (1972) (recommending use of civil monetary penalties in lOb-5 cases to deter defendants); Note,
supra note 31, at 488-91 (arguing that increased enforcement is also necessary to deter insider
trading).
45. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
46. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
47. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
48. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
49. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Id. at 224.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 225.
54. "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it catches must be fraud.
When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to
speak." Id. at 234-35.
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trading on the basis of material nonpublic information arises, if at all, as
a result of the defendant's relationship to the stockholders of the corpo-
ration in whose securities the defendant traded, 55 and that, generally,
only a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and other traders in
the same securities creates such a duty.56 Therefore, even though
Chiarella had used material nonpublic information to his personal bene-
fit, his trading did not violate section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 because he had
no relationship to the stockholders of the target companies in whose se-
curities he had traded, and so owed those investors no duty to refrain
from trading on the basis of the material nonpublic information he had
discovered.
In Dirks, the Court clarified under what circumstances the commu-
nication of material nonpublic information, "tipping," constitutes a
fraudulent breach of duty to the stockholders of the corporation in whose
securities a trade is made.5 7 It held that an insider who tips information
to another person breaches a duty owed to the shareholders only if the
purpose of the tip is to gain some personal benefit in exchange for the
information communicated.58 The Court also held that the tippee's duty
to refrain from using such information derives from the tipper's breach of
duty.59 If communication of the information by the tipper is not a
breach of duty, then the tippee's use of such information in a trade does
not violate the federal securities laws in the absence of a separate, special
55. "Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) ....
But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between the parties to a transaction." Id. at 230.
56. "[Ihe duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.'" Id. at 228 (footnote omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1976)).
57. Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer firm; he specialized in providing investment analyses
of insurance company stocks to institutional investors. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648. In that connection,
Dirks received material nonpublic information from Secrist, a former employee of Equity Funding of
America ("Equity Funding"), an insurance holding company whose stock was traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. Id. at 648-49 (citing statement of facts in Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829-30
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). Secrist told Dirks that the assets of Equity Funding were overstated as a result of
the company's fraudulent practices. Id. at 649.
Neither Dirks nor his firm traded in Equity Funding stock. Id. Dirks, however, investigated
the allegations and discussed the material nonpublic information he had gathered with clients and
investors, some of whom sold their stock in Equity Funding. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that
Dirks was not liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 665. In so holding, the Court limited a tippee's
potential for derivative liability to those situations where the tipper violated his duty to the corpora-
tion. Secrist, the tipper, did not breach such a duty. In the absence of such a breach, the tippee,
Dirks, could not be derivatively liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 659-67.
58. Id. at 663-64.
59. Id. at 661-62, 664.
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relationship between the tippee-trader and the corporation.60
In Chiarella and Dirks, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the
scope of activities proscribed by section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The deci-
sions leave trading or tipping on the basis of material nonpublic informa-
tion unregulated when that trading or tipping does not violate a duty
owed to an issuer or investor by virtue of a special relationship.61 In
Chiarella no violation occurred because the defendant-trader owed no
duty to the issuer or investors in the securities in which the defendant
traded. In Dirks no violation occurred because the defendant-tippee's
conduct could not be traced to breach of a duty by the tipper. 62 Con-
gress and the SEC have expressed dissatisfaction with these holdings,
which permit some persons to profit legally by trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information. 63 Although the specific problem of in-
sider trading found in Chiarella is now regulated by Rule 14e-3 of the
1934 Act,64 Congress's disenchantment with the substantive law of in-
sider trading added to the impetus for the adoption of the ITSA.65
60. Id. at 659-61.
61. But see infra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (discussing misappropriation theory); see
also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 n. 14 (discussing "temporary insider" theory, by which a duty to refrain
from using material nonpublic information derived from client may be imposed on attorney, ac-
countant or other professional who acts as temporary insider to the issuer).
62. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665-67.
63. HousE REPORT, supra note 31, at 22 (indicating an expansive view of Chiarella); A.B.A.
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud
Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 235 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
ABA Task Force Report]; see also Thomas, supra note 34, at 442 (discussing SEC's consideration of a
substantive amendment of Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b)).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1984); see Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the
Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1352-56 (1983).
65. See infra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (discussing misappropriation theory, an al-
ternative theory for liability under Rule l0b-5 after Chiarella).
In proposing and adopting the ITSA, however, both the SEC and Congress acted without the
benefit of a rigorous debate about the basic question whether insider trading should be prohibited at
all. The SEC wanted the additional enforcement weapon of treble damages and wanted it quickly.
See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 3, 12, 53, 230. The Commission succeeded in obtaining
quick action from Congress by taking what it believed to be the least controversial position on each
of the issues raised by commentators and members of Congress. In the end, the Act was almost
unopposed in Congress, see 130 CONG. REC. H7756-60 (daily ed. July 25, 1984); id. at S8911-14
(daily ed. June 29, 1984); 129 CONG. REC. H7011-13 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1983); the only significant
disagreement came from those who wanted the new statute to change existing substantive law to
bring nonfraudulent conduct within its reach, see 1983 House Hearings supra note 14, at 231. Yet
there still exists significant controversy not only about how to punish insider trading, but also about
whether it should be prohibited at all. See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 267; 1983 House Hear-
ings, supra note 14, at 34-36 (exchange between John Fedders and Rep. Wirth about whether insider
trading is a "victimless crime").
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B. General Description of the ITSA.
The heart of the new Act is the definition of the activity that creates
liability for treble damages. The treble damages provision is triggered
whenever "any person has violated any provision [of the 1934 Act]...
by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material non-
public information. ' '66 Thus, the ITSA is tied to the existing antifraud
provisions of the 1934 Act that govern insider trading-sections 10(b)
and 14(e), and Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3-and relies on a violation of these
provisions for its applicability.
The jurisdictional requirements of the ITSA, however, make it
slightly narrower in scope than section 10(b) and Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3.
It applies only to trades that are executed on a national securities ex-
change or through a broker or a dealer.67 In contrast, section 10(b) re-
quires for jurisdictional purposes only "the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange. ' 68 The jurisdictional scope of Rules
10b-5 and 14e-3 is substantially similar to that of section 10(b). 69 Thus,
not every violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14e-3 allows
the SEC to seek treble damages under the ITSA.
Furthermore, the ITSA does not apply to persons who have aided
and abetted a violation of the insider trading laws, 70 nor will the treble
66. ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). In addition, the provision limits the
applicability of the Act to trades that occur on a national securities exchange and are not part of a
public offering of securities by an issuer. See infra notes 67-69 (discussing jurisdictional scope of
ITSA).
Imposition of the treble damages remedy does not depend upon the court's willingness to enjoin
the defendant from future violations of the law. See Stevenson, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act:
Some Unfinished Business Ahead, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 18, col. 1.
67. The Act applies to insider trading that occurs in a "transaction (i) on or through the facili-
ties of a national securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and (ii) which is not part
of a public offering by an issuer of securities other than standardized options." ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). The Act excludes public offerings by an issuer probably because
there was little evidence that insider trading occurred in such circumstances.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
69. The jurisdictional scope of Rule lob-5 is essentially identical to that of section 10(b). Rule
14e-3 is limited by the jurisdictional requirements of section 14(e), pursuant to which the Rule was
promulgated. Although section 14(e) does not explicitly state its jurisdictional scope, it is presumed
to be limited to conduct that includes use of the mails or interstate commerce. See L. Loss, FIJNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 574-75 & n.23 (1983).
70. The Supreme Court has left open the issue whether liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 can be premised upon a theory of aiding and abetting a violation of the securities laws. Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 191 n.7 (1976). In the hearings on the ITSA, however, one member of Congress indicated his
approval of the aiding and abetting theory of liability. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 47
(comments of Rep. Rinaldo). Several federal courts of appeals have also endorsed the theory, See,
e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of section 10(b) premised upon finding that: (1) section 10(b) was violated by the conduct
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damages penalty be assessed against one who might be held vicariously
liable for the violation.71 Thus, the Act does not apply to all persons who
might be held liable in an SEC enforcement action for violation of the
insider trading laws. It is available only against persons directly and inti-
mately involved in wrongdoing: tippers of material nonpublic informa-
tion, as well as persons who trade on such information. 72 No conduct
other than tipping and trading will subject a person to liability under the
ITSA. The treble damages sanction is thus saved for those whose con-
duct directly undermines the integrity of the securities markets.73
of the primary party; (2) defendant aider and abetter had "general awareness that his role was part of
overall activity that is improper"; and (3) there was "knowing and substantial assistance of the
primary violation by the defendant") (citations omitted); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange,
503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). See generally Fischel, Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981); Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
71. Liability under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior can be imposed on em-
ployers for conduct of their employees which violates the federal securities laws so long as such
conduct is done within the scope of employment. Several circuits have imposed liability for federal
securities laws violations on employers solely on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Henrick-
sen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Paul F. Newton
& Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (endorsing the theory of
respondeat superior; case remanded for resolution of certain factual issues); Marbury Management,
Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). On the other hand,
some courts have rejected the theory of respondeat superior because of its apparent conflict with
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, which imposes liability upon controlling persons for securities laws
violations by persons under their control unless the controlling person shows that he "acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). Since liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is
broader than that under section 20(a), which does not extend to good faith conduct, these courts find
that section 20(a) supplanted the doctrine of respondeat superior in federal securities laws. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the doctrine of respondeat superior coexists with
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act and a similar provision, section 15, of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1982). In hearings on the ITSA, one member of Congress indicated approval of the
use of the respondeat superior theory of liability in securities law cases. See 1983 House Hearings,
supra note 14, at 47-48 (comments of Rep. Rinaldo). See generally Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 63 (1983); Fischel, supra note 70; Fitzpatrick &
Carmen, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1983).
72. Section 21(d)(2)(B) ofthe 1934 Act as amended by the ITSA provides: "No person shall be
subject to a sanction under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph solely because that person aided and
abetted a transaction covered by such subparagraph in a manner other than by communicating mate-
rial nonpublic information." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added).
73. See 130 CONG. REC. S8911-13 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
The ITSA contains a five-year statute of limitations for actions in which treble damages are
sought. ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(D) (Supp. I 1984). The five-year limitations period will
not apply to SEC actions for injunctive relief or disgorgement, or to private actions under section
10(b) or Rules lOb-5 or 14e-3. SEC actions for injunctive relief are not subject to any statute of
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The ITSA creates a civil penalty for violation of the insider trading
laws. Although Congress did not specifically label the Act a civil statute,
there are clear indications that Congress intended the ITSA's treble dam-
ages penalty to be a civil rather than a criminal sanction. 74 First, Con-
gress placed the treble damages provision of the ITSA in an amendment
to section 21 of the 1934 Act, which deals exclusively with the Commis-
sion's authorized activities and remedies. 75 The fact that the ITSA was
included as an amendment to section 21 indicates that it, like the rest of
section 21, relates to the powers and authority of the Commission. Since
the SEC is not authorized to prosecute criminal cases, 76 if Congress had
intended the ITSA to create a criminal sanction, placement of the Act in
section 21 would have been inappropriate. Furthermore, Congress's pur-
pose of broadening the SEC's enforcement power would not have been
served by making the ITSA a criminal statute, because only the Attorney
limitations; the equitable doctrine of laches governs the length of time during which the suit may be
brought. For private actions, the limitations period is determined by the law of the state in which
the action is brought. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 46. See generally L. Loss, supra
note 69, at 1166-67.
The ITSA accomplished other amendments to the 1934 Act outside the parameters of the treble
damages sanction in section 21(d). Congress amended section 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a), to increase
the maximum fine payable upon conviction of a criminal violation of the 1934 Act to $100,000.
ITSA § 3, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1265 (1984). In addition, section 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(4), was amended to add section 14 to the list of provisions a violation of which may trigger
the Commission's action. Id. § 4. Moreover, section 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4), now authorizes
the SEC to order compliance of a person who fails to comply with sections 12, 13, 14 or subsection
(d) of section 15 as well as "any person who was a cause of the failure" to comply with those
provisions. Id. Dan Goelzer, General Counsel of the SEC, said that he expects the Commission to
use section 15(c)(4) as a basis for barring repeat offenders from serving as officers and directors of
publicly held corporations, as an ancillary remedy in an SEC enforcement action. Goelzer also
indicated that he thought section 15(c)(4) gave the Commission the power to order such disassocia-
tion administratively, without resort to a court. See SEC to Step Up Attempts to Bar Persons Front
Corporate Office, Goelzer Says, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) 1825-26 (1984).
Finally, section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d), was amended to reach traders in options on securities,
and it specifies that trading in options on securities on the basis of material nonpublic information
violates an obligation to investors in the underlying securities to the same extent as if the trading on
nonpublic information were in the underlying securities themselves. ITSA § 5, Pub. L. No. 98-376,
98 Stat. 1265 (1984); cf Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.) (plain.
tiff option holder lacked standing under Rule lob-5 to sue General Dynamics for latter's trading in
its common stock on the basis of material nonpublic information), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
74. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) (ITSA
creates a Commission civil enforcement remedy, like disgorgement and injunctive relief); Thomas,
supra note 34, at 443-44. But see Reagan Signs Insider Trading Bill with Treble Damages, No Defiln-
tion, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1383 (1984).
75. Section 21 of the 1934 Act also authorizes the Commission to conduct investigations of
securities laws violations and empowers members of the SEC to subpoena witnesses to obtain evi-
dence as part of such investigations. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a), (h) (1982).
76. The 1934 Act, § 21(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984) (Commission empowered
to seek only injunctive relief; may refer violations to Attorney General, who may institute criminal
proceedings).
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General can bring criminal prosecutions for securities laws violations. 77
If the ITSA had been enacted as a criminal statute, it would not have
improved the Commission's ability to battle the insider trading problem.
It is also clear that Congress intended the treble damages penalty to
be available only to the SEC in enforcement actions, and not to private
litigants. First, placement of the Act in section 21 indicates this intent to
augment only the Commission's enforcement power.78 Second, the ITSA
requires penalties assessed to be paid into the United States Treasury; it
does not authorize recovery of treble damages by a private litigant. 79
Thus, even if a private plaintiff could claim treble damages under the
ITSA, the plaintiff could not obtain the benefit of the sanction. The right
to invoke the provisions of the Act is therefore meaningless for a private
litigant unless he is thoroughly altruistic. Finally, the legislative history
of the ITSA makes it clear that Congress intended the sanction to supple-
ment the enforcement arsenal already available to the SEC. 0 The record
contains no indication that treble damages are available to the victim of
insider trading.
C. Scope of the ITSA.
There are two problems with the ITSA's description of the pro-
scribed activity to which the treble damages penalty applies.81 First, to
the extent the Act describes the prohibited conduct at all, the description
is not consistent with judicial enunciations of what constitutes illegal in-
77. Id.
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 230-31
(considering question of enforcement by private plaintiffs).
79. Section 2 ofthe ITSA amends the 1934 Act, § 21(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp.
11 1984), to provide: "The amount of such penalty .. shall be payable into the Treasury of the
United States." See also Thomas, supra note 34, at 445 (provision requiring penalty to be paid into
the Treasury inserted to make the Act noncontroversial and assure speedy passage).
80. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 11-12; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at
56 (Chairman Shad indicating cumulative nature of ITSA by stating that Commission intended to
use all remedies it already had in addition to treble damages sanction). But see Musslewhite, The
Measure of the Disgorgement Remedy in SEC Enforcement Actions: SEC v. MacDonald, 12 SEC.
REG. L.J. 138, 175 (1984) ("It is possible that because of the existence of the proposed statute
[ITSA], a court will decide in a future SEC action for disgorgement that the disgorgement remedy is
not necessary to enforce effectively the securities laws. This decision would result from a court's
reexamination of whether disgorged profits should be made available to injured investors.").
For legislative history showing that the ITSA remedy was intended exclusively for use by the
SEC, and not by private plaintiffs, see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 47. In discussing
whether a right to jury trial should be granted for cases brought under the ITSA, the SEC argued
that such a right need not be granted because actions under the ITSA would be brought by the
government, not by a private party. Id.; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 44849 n.6 (1977). For a discussion of the possibility of private
actions under the ITSA, see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 230-31, 238, 257-59.
81. ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. 11 1984).
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sider trading. This lack of consistency undoubtedly will create confusion
and new issues for litigation.
The second problem with the ITSA's formulation of prohibited con-
duct is more fundamental. The statute fails to define the scope of the
conduct subject to the penalty. The Act incorporates the substantive law
of Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 for a definition of insider trading. The failure of
the ITSA to define insider trading is not a serious problem as long as
Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 make clear what activity is prohibited.8 2 The lines
separating legal from illegal activity under Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3, how-
ever, are not clear. The ITSA ignores the unsettled state of insider trad-
ing laws and the possibility that traders may act illegally without
knowledge or reason to know that their conduct is illegal; the Act merely
authorizes imposition of the treble damages penalty on all individuals
who violate any of the relevant provisions.
1. Description of the Prohibited Conduct. The ITSA prohibits
"purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic
information. '8 3 Interpreted literally, the Act extends to anyone who
trades while in possession of material nonpublic information whether or
not the information motivates the transaction. That is, mere possession
of the information at the time of the trade creates a conclusive presump-
tion that the information was a significant factor in the decision to buy or
sell the security. While the breadth of this description furnishes the SEC
with a powerful enforcement tool, it also requires the Commission to
exercise its rulemaking authority carefully to ensure that the ITSA does
not punish innocent trading.
The apparently broad embrace of the Act represents a change from
existing judicial interpretations, which have construed Rule lOb-5 to pro-
hibit trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. 4 The courts
82. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 41 (memorandum from SEC Office of General
Counsel) ("In the majority of insider trading cases it is clear what the law proscribes."). Especially
in cases in which an officer, director or other fiduciary trades on the basis of inside information, the
standards of legality generally are well established. See the discussion in Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1980) and cases cited therein.
83. ITSA § 2, 15 U.SC. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added); see 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 14, at 48-50.
84. Rule 14e-3, unlike section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, does use this "in possession of" language.
The discussion in the text accompanying notes 84-86 therefore does not encompass Rule 14e-3.
For examples of courts' use of the "on the basis of" language, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
653 n.10 (1983) (referring to "[t]he duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to
trade on inside information") (emphasis added); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839
(2d Cir. 1968) (complaint alleged that defendants purchased stock "on the basis of material inside
information") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp.
425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (liability under Rule l0b-5 attaches to those "who trade on the basis of
material nonpublic information tainted by the breach of an insider's fiduciary duty") (emphasis ad-
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have required that a causative relationship exist between the possession
of information and the trade before finding a violation of Rule lOb-5.
The "on the basis of" language used by the courts expresses this neces-
sary causative link; the material nonpublic information must have been a
substantial reason-a motivating factor-for the decision to trade in or-
der for the trade to violate Rule 10b-5.
In many cases the difference in terminology-between "on the basis
of" and "in possession of"--will not represent a difference in substance.
Generally, if an individual is aware of certain information and such infor-
mation is material, 85 any trading done by the individual will be based at
least in part on that information. It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to divorce an individual's awareness of an item of material nonpublic
information about a security from the amassed knowledge that formed
the basis of the individual's decision to trade in that security. Usually,
therefore, one may establish the causal link between the information and
the trading decision by showing that a defendant was aware of material
nonpublic information and traded in a manner consistent with the
message conveyed by such information. Such a showing creates a pre-
sumption that the trade was accomplished on the basis of, or because of,
the new piece of nonpublic information, and the defendant generally is
unable to rebut that presumption.
The difference between "trading while in possession of" information
and "trading on the basis of" that information may be very significant,
however, in the case of institutional investors and other non-natural per-
ded); cf In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) ("We, and the courts have consist-
ently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal. ... ) (emphasis added).
In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court discussed In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), as a case in which the SEC held that "a broker-dealer and his firm
violated that section [10(b)] by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information." Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 226 (emphasis added); in his concurring opinion in Chiarella, Justice Brennan agreed
with the majority that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his
own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities." Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also id. at 229 ("The federal
courts have found violations of § 10(b) where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
85. A "fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding" whether to buy, sell or hold onto his stock. TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); cf Dooley, supra note 20, at 6 (defining information as
material "if the market price rose or fell upon its publication and if the previously trading insider
thereby made a profit or avoided a loss").
Materiality is also relevant to causation in a Rule lOb-5 case. If an individual is aware of
material nonpublic information about the securities in question and trades in a manner that is consis-
tent with such information, because the information is material we can assume it motivated the
individual's decision to trade. If the nonpublic information is not material, we cannot assume that it
motivated a reasonable investor's, or this individual's, decision to trade.
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sons.86 An essential characteristic of an institutional investor or firm is
that it has the capacity to act only through individuals. Accordingly, a
firm may be in possession of information and act on a matter to which
that information relates without the connection between the information
and the action necessarily being brought home to any single individual
within the firm.
Although the ITSA does not define the term "possession" for these
purposes, the common law of agency may supply the necessary doctrine.
Under the common law, a principal (here, the institution) legally "pos-
sesses" information whenever any of its agents or employees are cogni-
zant of the information and the information is related to that agent's or
employee's duties for the firm.8 7 Thus, a firm would be in possession of
information if one of its researchers discovered the information in the
course of his research activities.
Once the firm possesses the information, the ITSA indicates that
any trade in the relevant securities executed on behalf of the firm is pre-
sumed to have been motivated by such information. It is easy to imagine
a situation, however, in which the individual who executes a trade is una-
ware of the material nonpublic information discovered by the researcher.
In this situation, the firm has traded while in possession of material non-
public information, but there is no causal relationship between the pos-
session of the information and the decision to trade. Under these
circumstances, the firm should not be held to have violated the insider
trading laws.
Congress anticipated this problem. The legislative history of the
Act demonstrates Congress's expectation that the SEC would exercise its
86. See generally 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 48-49, 177, 196-97, 208, 244-46, 297,
315 (discussing "in possession of' language); Stevenson, supra note 66, at 18, 20 (suggesting that "in
possession of" language will create issues for litigation due to its conflict with Chiarella and Dirks,
both of which held that mere possession of information was not enough to obligate the trader to
disclose or abstain).
87. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 272-282 (1958). Generally, an
agent's knowledge will be imputed to the principal whenever such knowledge concerns "a matter as
to which. . .[the agent] acts within his power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty to
give the principal information." Id. § 272.
Mechem suggests two reasons for this rule. First, "the agent, while keeping within the scope of
his authority, is, as to the matters embraced within it, for the time being the principal himself, or, at
all events, the alter ego of the principal-the principal's other self. Whatever notice or knowledge,
then, reaches the agent under these circumstances, in law reaches the principal." F. MECHEM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 719, at 548 (1889). Second, "it is the duty of the agent to
disclose to his principal, all notice or knowledge which he may possess and which is necessary for the
principal's protection or guidance. This duty the law presumes the agent to have performed ... "
Id.
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rulemaking power to provide protection for firms in this situation. 88
Congress had in mind a rule patterned after Rule 14e-3(b) that would
provide that liability not be imposed on a firm if it showed, first, that the
person who traded in the security on the firm's behalf did so without
knowledge of the relevant material nonpublic information and, second,
that the firm had enacted procedures to ensure that the material nonpub-
lic information would not reach the person who traded on behalf of the
firm.89 If the trader was unaware of the material nonpublic information
and the firm had established procedures sufficient to keep separate its
trading activities from its research activities, then the rule presumably
will except the firm from liability under the ITSA because the trade
would not have violated the insider trading prohibitions.
There are two significant consequences of the approach of the ITSA
and the rule contemplated by Congress and the Commission. First, the
rule would place the burden of proof on the defendant to show that the
trade was not made on the basis of the material nonpublic information,
rather than require the SEC to prove the causal nexus between the pos-
session of information and the trade.90 That is, mere possession of mate-
rial nonpublic information coupled with the occurrence of a trade
consistent with such information would give rise to a presumption that
the firm had violated the law. It would be up to the firm, then, to rebut
the presumption. This seems to change the traditional allocation of the
burdens of persuasion. It reduces the burden on the SEC and increases
the burden on the defendant on the issue whether the person who traded
for the firm knew of the material information at issue.91 Congress was
88. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 11; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 90 (state-
ment of SEC General Counsel Goelzer); see also 130 CONG. REC. S8913-14 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(statement of Sen. D'Amato).
89. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 1283-84. Rule 14e-3(b) provides:
A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of this section if
such person shows that:
(l)The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such person to
purchase or sell any security described in paragraph (a) of this section or to cause any such
security to be purchased or sold by or on behalf of others did not know the material,
nonpublic information; and
(2)Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures,
reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person's
business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate para-
graph (a) of this section, which policies and procedures may include, but are not limited to,
(i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing any purchase and sale of any such
security or (ii) those which prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1985).
90. See the lead-in to Rule 14e-3(b), supra note 89, which states that a person will not be held to
violate Rule 14e-3(a) if "such person shows that" the requirements of Rule 14e-3(b) are satisfied. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985) (emphasis added).
91. Traditionally, of course, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of a prima
facie case. One element in an action under section 10(b) is that the defendant traded because of his
knowledge of the material nonpublic information. l re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,
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either unaware of this change or simply failed to articulate its intent to
modify the respective burdens of proof of the parties. In either case, this
shift in the burden of proof is more efficient than the traditional ap-
proach, since the defendant institution usually has better access than the
SEC to facts relevant to the trader's knowledge.
Second, the rule contemplated by Congress would condition nonlia-
bility on the existence of a Chinese Wall-a communication bar between
researchers and traders-or other isolating procedures enacted by the
firm.92 There may be cases, however, in which a firm has not established
effective Chinese Wall or other isolating procedures and yet should not
be held liable for a violation of the insider trading provisions. Such cases
would arise whenever the person who traded on behalf of the firm can
affirmatively prove that when he traded he was unaware of the material
nonpublic information obtained by another member of the firm. The
trader's affirmative proof of ignorance should rebut the presumption that
the trade was motivated by the secret information, even though that ig-
norance did not result from the isolating procedures. The SEC should
include an exception to liability to cover such a case in the rule it adopts
pursuant to the Act.
641 (1971) (listing as one element of a case under Rule lob-5 "that the information be a factor in his
decision to effect the transactions") (footnote omitted); see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 916 (1961) (finding that broker willfully violated sections 17(a) and 10(b) and Rule lOb-5; once
he had heard the nonpublic information he "hastened to sell" his shares before the information was
made public).
The language of the ITSA ought to reflect existing law if it is indeed not the purpose of the Act
to alter such law. The use of the "in possession" language, when the legal standard requires a causal
relationship between the information and the trade, will only create unnecessary confusion. Inevita-
bly, a private plaintiff will use this language in the ITSA to argue that evidence of possession is
sufficient to prove an unlawful use of information, even though circumstances may suggest that use
was not prompted by possession.
During a discussion of the appropriate language for the ITSA, Mr. Fedders, then Director of
Enforcement at the SEC, stated that the "in possession of" standard had been used by courts in
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 49, But see cases cited
supra note 84.
92. See SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 6239, 17,120, 11,336, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980) (discussing use of Chinese Wall or other isolating
procedure in context of Rule 14e-3); see also Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 403
(2d Cir. 1974) (noting that SEC favors use of Chinese Walls); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968) (as part of settlement with SEC for a violation of Rule lOb-5,
Merrill Lynch adopted a statement of policy to effectuate a Chinese Wall); Herzel & Coiling, The
Chinese Wall Revisited, 6 CORP. L. REV. 116 (1983); Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Coul-
flict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73 (1978); Huck, The Fatal Lure of the "Impermeable
Chinese Wall," 94 BANKING L.J. 100 (1977); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the
Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975); Varn, The Multi-Service Secur-
ities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New Look in the Light ofthe Federal Securities Code, 63 NED. L.
REV. 197 (1984).
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In addition to uncertainty whether a causative link must exist be-
tween the information and the trade, another ambiguous aspect of the
ITSA-a firm's liability for nonmanagement employees' trading-should
be cured by the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking authority. The
Act leaves unclear whether any employee, even a very junior employee,
can expose the employer-firm to liability for treble damages by trading on
the firm's behalf on the basis of material nonpublic information in viola-
tion of Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14e-3. All that is clear from the legislative
history of the Act is that if the board of directors or senior management
of the firm knows of the material nonpublic information and directs the
trade, the firm is subject to the treble damages penalty. 93 Neither the
legislative history of the Act nor the administrative record of Rule 14e-3,
after which Congress anticipated the new rule would be patterned, ad-
dresses firm liability for trading by lower-level employees. 94 Without an
exception, then, it seems that the treble damages penalty could be sought
in a case where any employee of the firm traded on the basis of material
nonpublic information for the firm.
Liability of a firm for trading by employees below the senior level is
inconsistent with the Act's explicit rejection of liability for the treble
damages penalty based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.95 If the
doctrine applied, the firm could be held liable when an employee gener-
ally authorized to trade on the firm's behalf did so on the basis of mate-
rial nonpublic information. 96 Because Congress rejected the respondeat
superior doctrine in the ITSA, the SEC ought to provide an exclusion
from the penalty for firm trading done by low-level employees. The
Commission should also specifically define those senior-level employees
whose trading will result in a penalty against the firm.
2. Absence of a Definition of Insider Trading. The failure of the
ITSA to define insider trading is troublesome. The outer boundaries of
liability for insider trading under Rule lOb-5 have been in an almost con-
stant state of flux since In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the seminal decision
that first articulated the duty to refrain from trading on material nonpub-
93. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 10 ("Thus, if the board of directors of a corporation,
while having material nonpublic information, directed an employee to trade for the corporation's
account, the corporation itself would be liable for the penalty."); see also 1984 Senate Hearings,
supra note 14, at 26-27.
94. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,646, at 83,463-64 (Sept. 4, 1980).
95. But see Langevoort, supra note 31, at 1283-84 (asserting that nonmanagerial employee's
trading could subject employer to liability under ITSA).
96. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 180-83 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982).
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lic information. 97 The most recent adjustments by the Supreme Court to
the scope of duty created by Rule lOb-5 occurred in Chiarella and
Dirks.98 Most of the uncertainty today centers on the potential liability
of persons who do not fit within the traditional categories of "insiders,"
which include officers, directors, controlling shareholders and other fidu-
ciaries. New theories of liability-the misappropriation theory in partic-
ular-have been developed to find "outsiders" liable for trading on the
basis of material nonpublic information. The Supreme Court has not yet
determined the validity of the misappropriation theory. Nor has it ad-
dressed two other issues arising under Rule 10b-5: whether only inten-
tional conduct violates the provision or merely reckless acts suffice; and
whether these provisions prohibit "front-running." 99 As a result, the
dimensions of the prohibition against insider trading are unclear. De-
fendants whose conduct does not clearly violate the underlying provi-
sions of the ITSA-Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3-may use this lack of
clarity to argue that they did not have adequate notice that their conduct
was illegal and that the imposition of a penalty is therefore unfair.
97. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), the SEC announced that a duty to
disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading until such disclosure is made rests
on two factors:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id. (footnote omitted). Later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), Judge Waterman found that Rule lOb-5 is "based in policy on the
justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information." Id. at 848 (citations omitted). This
"parity of information" rule was rejected by the Supreme Court in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33; see
supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella and Dirks); see also Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) ("exact nature and scope" of the federal
law governing tippee trading liability "remain in a formative stage"), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
98. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-61 (trading on material nonpublic information violates Rule lob-
5 only if trader or tipper had fiduciary relationship with other investors and benefitted personally by
the tip); Chidarella, 445 U.S. at 232-35 (in the absence of a fiduciary-type relationship between the
inside trader and other investors in the securities, no duty to disclose material nonpublic information
arises); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant must have a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff to be within the scope of Rule lOb-5); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 883, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[Alnyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or. . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the securi-
ties concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (duty to disclose or
abstain from trading arises from "the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone, and, second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing") (footnote omitted),
99. Front-running occurs when a person trades on information about other trading in the same
securities. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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One example of the current confusion surrounding the scope of Rule
lOb-5's application to outsiders revolves around the use of the misappro-
priation theory. This theory, based upon the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Stevens in Chiarella, 00 posits that an employee who takes
confidential, material nonpublic information from the employer and
trades on the basis of it violates a duty under Rule lOb-5.' 0 The duty
arises from the employment relationship; it obligates an employee to re-
frain from using confidential information gained from the employment
for personal benefit. The misappropriation theory is used most often in
cases in which a defendant trades in the securities of a company that is
the target of a proposed, but as yet unannounced, tender offer. Although
the defendant has no relationship to the target company, he learns of the
intended tender offer through someone connected with the proposed
transaction. As in Chiarella, the defendant in such circumstances has no
fiduciary or other relationship to the target or its stockholders.10 2 Under
the analysis of Rule lOb-5 articulated in Chiarella, no liability would at-
tach. Thus, the misappropriation theory provides a way to hold a de-
fendant like Chiarella liable under Rule lOb-5 even though the defendant
breached no duty owed to the holders of the traded securities.
The Supreme Court has not upheld the misappropriation theory,
and there are several reasons to question the theory's viability. 10 3 The
theory depends on the existence of a duty owed by an employee to his
employer to refrain from using employment-related information for per-
sonal benefit.' 0 4 Proponents of the misappropriation theory derive this
duty from the common law obligations resulting from the employee's
100. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Justice Stevens posed the question of liability under the misappropriation theory as
"whether the petitioner's breach of his duty of silence-a duty he unquestionably owed to his em-
ployer and his employer's customers-could give rise to criminal liability under Rule lOb-5." Id. at
238. See generally Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpub-
lic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101 (1984).
A variant on the misappropriation theory was suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent
in Chiarella. He argued that section 10(b) imposes on "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information . . . an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This obligation does not require that the misap-
propriation constitute a breach of duty to someone, as does Justice Stevens's version of the theory.
102. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
103. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985), a case in which liability rested on the misappropriation
theory. Only the Second Circuit has upheld the misappropriation theory as of the date of this arti-
cle. But in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985), the Supreme
Court indicated in dicta its support of the misappropriation theory: "We have also noted that a
tippee may be liable if he otherwise 'misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information."' Id. at
2630 n.22 (Brennan, J.) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655).
104. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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agency relationship with the principal.10 5 An agent has a duty to refrain
from profiting personally by using any confidential information acquired
during the course of the agent's employment. 10 6 This common law duty
is not limited to use of the information that causes an injury to the princi-
pal. Rather, in order to "avoid difficult factual inquir[ies] and prevent
the conflict of interest," it reaches all uses of confidential information by
an agent for personal gain.10 7 In short, simply by using confidential in-
formation to trade in securities, the agent breaches this obligation to the
principal. 108
Basing a violation of Rule lOb-5 on the defendant-employee's breach
of this duty to the employer, however, is inconsistent with judicial con-
structions of the provision, which predicate liability on injury to persons
to whom a duty is owed. 109 Since the employer is not an investor in the
securities traded by the defendant, the employer is not directly injured by
the employee-trader's breach of duty. The requirement of a predicate
injury underlies the need for plaintiffs in private actions under Rule lOb-
5 to establish standing to sue by proving that they were purchasers or
sellers of the securities in which the defendant traded."t0 While the pur-
chaser-seller rule has not been applied in enforcement actions brought
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958). But the language of section 388
itself does not support the notion of a duty of the employee in these circumstances. It prohibits
profit by an agent from "transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal." Id. Here, the
agent profits by trading, not on behalf of the principal, but solely for himself.
106. See Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1307, 1360-74 (1981) (arguing that common law prohibits agent from using information gained from
principal for any purpose not intended by principal); see also Block & Hoff, Life After Dirks: Can
Outsider Trading Constitute Fraud?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983 at 15, 19-20 (questioning whether
investment banking firm of acquiring corporation in tender offer owes any duty to target company to
refrain from trading on basis of undisclosed information about anticipated tender offer).
While directors do not fit neatly into the category of agents because the corporation-principal
cannot act without them, and thus cannot practically direct them, they nonetheless are considered
agents for purposes of the fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation and its shareholders. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 comment c (1957).
107. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 19 n.74 (1982); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 comment c
(1957). The Restatement provides, however, that the principal and agent may alter this rule by
agreement. Id.
108. In some cases, as in Chiarella, the tender offeror, who is in the investing market, would be
affected. See SEC v. Wyman, Litigation Release No. 9311, 22 S.E.C. Docket 391 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
1981) (consent decree); Langevoort, supra note 107, at 48-49.
109. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; see also PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 731 (4th
ed. 1971) (injury is element of prima facie case of fraud under common law).
110. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.) (Rule 1Ob-5 extends protec-
tion only to defrauded seller or purchaser), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); see also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-55 (1975) (adopting Birnbaum rule).
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under Rule lOb-5,'1 1 a lack of investment interest by the principal does
bear on the soundness of the misappropriation theory. Rule lOb-5 pro-
hibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' ' 12
One must ask, therefore, whether anyone was defrauded and whether the
fraud was sufficiently associated with the trading in securities to come
within the scope of Rule lOb-5. 13
The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "fraud" in Rule lOb-5
to require proof of deception. 114 "[R]ule lOb-5 cases have consistently
involved a deception connected to the deceived person's purchase or sale
of a security, a decision not to purchase or sell, or some other investment
related activity."' 15 This connection between the deception and an inves-
tor does not appear in cases in which the SEC invokes the misappropria-
tion theory. 16 Not all breaches of fiduciary duty include deception.11 7
For example, an open and notorious use of confidential information by
an employee for purposes of trading in securities may be a breach of
fiduciary duty, but it does not deceive the principal. Thus, the necessity
of finding deception appears to preclude using the misappropriation the-
ory in many of the situations to which it was designed to apply.
Even assuming that misappropriation does deceive the principal, if
the principal has made no investment decision related to the securities
traded by the agent, one must question whether the employee's trading
violates section 10(b). The statute is designed primarily to protect inves-
tors," 8 and the "injured" party, the employer, is not among them.
Moreover, an action for fraud at common law required a showing of in-
jury by the party defrauded.' 19 "[A] statutory provision that prohibits
fraud and deception in connection with a purchase or sale of securities
11. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985) (emphasis added).
113. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) ("The crux
of the present case is that [the plaintiff] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching
its sale of securities as an investor.") (emphasis added).
114. In Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977), the Supreme Court held that
deception is a necessary element of a claim under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In that case, a
breach of fiduciary duty was alleged, and there was full disclosure made of such breach, id. at 467;
the Supreme Court ruled that no cause of action under Rule lOb-5 had been stated. Id. at 474.
115. Langevoort, supra note 107, at 46.
116. See id. at 46-47. If the agent had permission to use the information for his personal benefit,
such use, of course, would not amount to deception.
117. See supra note 114; see also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages
under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 350-53 (1979) (distinguishing breaches of
fiduciary duty from narrower category of breaches of fiduciary duty involving deception).
118. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1981) (Dumbald, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983); Aldave, supra note 101, at 117-21.
119. See supra note 109.
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should require a showing that the person allegedly defrauded was en-
gaged in some investment related activity in order to establish liabil-
ity." ' 20 Here, the employer was not involved in any investment decision,
yet it is the breach of duty of the defendant to the employer that results
in liability. It is difficult to see how such a set of facts satisfies the "in
connection with" language of section 10(b), or the notion that fraud re-
quires some showing of injury.
On the other hand, in addition to protecting investors, section 10(b)
was intended to protect the integrity of the securities market.' 2' It has
been argued that since insider trading undermines the public's confidence
in the market, all trading on nonpublic information should be within the
scope of a section 10(b) enforcement action.' 22 Under this argument, a
defendant's own trading in securities satisfies the necessary link to the
purpose of section 10(b) as well as the causation requirement embodied
in the "in connection with" language.
This reliance on the defendant's own trading seems to prove too
much. If the basis for labelling the trading "bad"-that is, a violation of
a fiduciary duty owed by the defendant-has no relationship to any in-
vestment activity by the defrauded principal, it is difficult to see how this
trading constitutes a fraud that touches another's investment decision.
Whatever fraud exists is on one person, while the investment is by others.
This disassociation of the fraud from the investors conflicts with the
Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella. There the Supreme Court went
to great lengths to state that only trading that breaches a duty to someone
who is also trading violates section 10(b).123 The improper use of the
information forms the basis of the misappropriation theory, rather than
any relationship between that use in trading and another investor as to
whom such use of information was improper. The lack of a breach of
duty to or deception of anyone who traded in the securities renders the
misappropriation theory of doubtful validity. 124
The SEC has used the misappropriation theory in several of its en-
120. Langevoort, supra note 31, at 1297 (footnote omitted).
121. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
122. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-5.
123. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) ("Such liability [under Rule 10b.5]
is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction.") (emphasis added); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983).
124. In the hearings on the ITSA, the SEC and some members of Congress clearly endorsed the
misappropriation theory. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 34; 1983 House Hearings,
supra note 14, at 17 (statement of Chairman Shad); id. at 36 (statement of Rep. Wirth); see also
Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 345 n.21 (1982) (dis-
cussing deficiencies in Second Circuit's opinion in Newman, and lack of consistency between misap-
propriation theory and Chiarella). See generally Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates
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forcement actions 25 and no doubt will continue to do so, at least until
the theory is judged by the Supreme Court. With the advent of the
ITSA, the validity of the theory assumes greater significance, since the
SEC is likely to invoke it not only in seeking disgorgement but also in
seeking treble damages. When a penalty is imposed, purposes of specific
deterrence and requirements of fairness are only served when the defend-
ant is able to recognize from previous articulations of the standards of
legality that his conduct violates the law.126
In addition to the misappropriation theory, another ambiguous as-
pect of the law prohibiting insider trading is the degree of scienter that a
defendant must have before liability can be imposed under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court has held that scienter, that is, inten-
tional conduct,1 27 violates Rule lOb-5, but has left open the question
whether recklessness can support liability. All lower federal courts that
have considered the issue, however, have decided that some form of reck-
lessness is sufficient. 2 8
Confidential Information May Be Charged With Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman, 31
DEPAUL L. REV. 849 (1982).
In SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 92,004 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 1985), the misappropriation theory was used to find a tipper and tippee liable under Rules
lOb-5 and 14e-3. The court held that even though the tipper had no fiduciary relationship to the
corporation in whose securities the tippee traded and to which the tip related, the tip constituted a
breach of duty of the tipper to his employer, and this was sufficient to find liability under 10b-5. Id.
at 90,978-79. This seems to be in clear conflict with Dirks.
125. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112
(1985); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,004 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Brant, [1984 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,571 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984).
126. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422 (1958).
But see Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regula-
tions, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 423, 441-42 (1963).
127. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). Scienter "refers to a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12. An insider who actually
knows that he has material nonpublic information at the time he trades will be found to have the
requisite mental state for liability under section 10(b). SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir.
1983). The Second Circuit expanded that definition in the context of tipping in Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). For that purpose, an insider who deliberately tips information
which he knows is material and nonpublic to an outsider who may use that information to his benefit
will satisfy the requirement of scienter. Id. at 167; see also ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63, at
241 (requiring knowledge of or recklessness as to facts which give rise to the duty to disclose or
abstain from trading).
128. See, e.g., White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982) (judgment n.o.v. im-
proper where there was conflicting evidence about whether insurance agent was "severely reckless"
in interpreting the safety of notes); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recklessness
sufficient to warrant aider and abettor liability under Rule lOb-5), rev'd on other grounds. 463 U.S.
646 (1983); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982) (reckless incorporator
liable to investor for failing to ensure investor's knowledge of the terms of investment); Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1981) (accounting firm liable under lOb-5 for its
employee's reckless issuance of tax opinion letter), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Broad v.
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Under Rule 14e-3, a violation of which also may give rise to treble
damages under the Act, the issue of scienter is clearer. Rule 14e-3 speci-
fies that the defendant must know or have reason to know the source of
the material nonpublic information, and must know or have reason to
know that the information is nonpublic.' 2 9 Although the Rule does not
define "reason to know," this standard is well developed in the law gener-
ally. Moreover, the SEC suggested in its release announcing the adop-
tion of the Rule that the "reason to know" standard implies a duty of
inquiry by a person in possession of facts sufficient to raise the suspicion
of a reasonable person.1 30
These requirements of scienter under Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 do not
guarantee that a defendant held liable knew that his conduct violated the
law.1 31 On the contrary, the defendant's knowledge of the law is irrele-
vant for purposes of civil enforcement of the insider trading laws. t32
Since the law is ambiguous in some respects, however, the traditional
scienter requirement-which may be appropriate in traditional civil en-
forcement actions-may be inadequate to ensure that the defendant de-
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose convertability of debentures
into options, prior to merger, was not actionable under lOb-5 in the absence of "severe reckless-
ness"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.
1980) (real estate investment company liable under lOb-5 for reckless misstatements in partnership
prospectus); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516-17 (1st Cir. 1978) (although reckless-
ness will support a lOb-5 action, underwriter's false statements in private placement solicitation were
not reckless); Berhadl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (indicating, without ruling
definitively, that "gross recklessness" will satisfy scienter requirement); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dil-
lon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.) (broker aided and abetted investment advisor's l0b-5 viola-
tion by virtue of reckless assurances of confidence to investor where fiduciary duty existed), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795-97 (7th Cir. 1977)
(underwriter not liable for misstatements to commercial paper purchasers where underwriter not
reckless).
129. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. Nos. 6239, 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,646, at 83,458 (Sept. 4, 1980). Paragraph (a) of Rule 14e-3 provides:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a
tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipula-
tive act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who
is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he
knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from: (1) the offering person, (2) the issuer of the secur-
ities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) any officer, director, partner or
employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to
purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or
to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or
otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985) (emphasis added).
130. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,646, at 83,458 n.36.
131. See supra note 129.
132. See supra note 127.
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serves punishment of the sort provided in the ITSA as opposed to the
traditional remedies available in a civil action.133
A third unsettled area of the law regulating insider trading concerns
a practice commonly known as "front-running." Front-running occurs
when a person trades on information about other trading in the same
securities. 134 For example, if a broker-dealer learns that a customer has
placed an order to sell a large block of stock,135 the broker-dealer could
profit before the sale is disclosed to the market by selling his stock in the
same company before the market price declines as a result of the block
trade. 136 The congressional hearings on the ITSA demonstrate the desire
of the Commission and some members of Congress that Rule lOb-5 pro-
hibit front-running. 137 So far, Rule lOb-5 has not been applied to front-
running, although the exchanges and the NASD have the authority to
regulate it. 138
It is doubtful whether Rule lOb-5 as construed by Dirks and
Chfarella reaches front-running, since the broker-dealer owes no duty to
the corporation in whose securities he trades.' 39 .One could only obviate
the requirement that a duty exist between the broker-dealer and other
traders in the security by resort to the misappropriation theory. Under
that theory, the broker-dealer's use of the information about the block
trade might constitute a breach of duty either to his employer, if the
broker-dealer traded on his own behalf, or to his employer's customer,
133. See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., S.E.C. Release No. 20,663 (Feb. 17, 1984) (defining front-Fruhning), reprinted in 29
S.E.C. Docket 1400, 1403 n.32 (1984); S.E.C. Release No. 14,156 (Nov. 9, 1977) (same), reprinted in
13 S.E.C. Docket 661, 661 (1977).
135. A block trade is a purchase or sale of a large quantity of shares (usually 10,000 or more
shares) in one consolidated transaction.
136. In order to accommodate investors' desires to make block trades, a number of registered
broker-dealers maintain block trading departments. Typically, block trades are privately negotiated
transactions and are not auctioned on the exchange floor. Results of a privately negotiated block
trade are made public after the consummation of the transaction. The terms of the trade-number
of securities traded and price per share-are brought to the exchange floor to appear on the tape and
to comply with Exchange Rule 394, which prohibits exchange members from engaging in off-board
trading in shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See generally J. COHEN, E. ZINBARO &
A. ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 88-95 (4th ed. 1982).
137. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 36.
138. See NASD By-Laws, Article XII, Rules of Fair Practice, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1251
(1985) (conferring on exchange general rulemaking authority); S.E.C. Release No. 20,663, supra
note 134, at 1403 & n.32 (discussing New York Stock Exchange's rules against front-running);
S.E.C. Release No. 14,156, supra note 134, at 661-62 (discussing Chicago Board Options Exchange's
proposed rule against front-running); see also Paine Webber Fined By Big Board, CBOE For "Front
Running," Wall St. J., June 12, 1985, § 1, at 12, col. 2 (report of censure and fine of Paine Webber,
Inc. by New York Stock Exchange and Chicago Board Options Exchange for different kind of activ-
ity, also labelled front-running; Paine Webber allegedly bought shares and options for shares in
company it was about to recommend to its clients for investment).
139. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
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the block trader, if the broker-dealer traded on his firm's account.1 40
Thus, the soundness of the misappropriation theory becomes more
significant.
In short, the ITSA makes determining the soundness of the misap-
propriation theory important for two reasons. First, the SEC may em-
ploy the theory to assess treble damages for conduct not clearly violative
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as interpreted in Chiarella and Dirks and
for which only disgorgement could have been sought prior to the ITSA.
Second, the theory appears to provide the only means for effecting Con-
gress's intent that front-running be punishable under these provisions.
More generally, the ITSA raises questions of fairness to the extent it per-
mits severe penalties for conduct not clearly proscribed.
In light of these and other areas of ambiguity in the law under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Congress and the SEC did consider including
a definition of insider trading in the Act. 141 Several definitions were pro-
posed. First, the proposed Federal Securities Code of the American Law
Institute contains a provision that prohibits traditional insider trading. 142
140. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
141. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 34-39; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at
50-55.
In addition to the proposed definitions discussed in the text accompanying notes 142-48 infra, a
definition was suggested by the New York State Bar Association that would have specified that the
trader must have known that the "information was obtained directly or indirectly from the issuer, an
affiliate of the issuer or a person or affiliate of a person who has commenced or has taken substantial
steps to commence a tender offer." 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 308. Moreover, the New
York State Bar's draft would require the SEC to prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence
in order to recover the penalty. Id. See infra notes 190-224 and accompanying text. In addition to
the ABA Task Force Report proposal that is discussed infra text at notes 144-45 and reproduced infra
note 145, the Task Force proposed an alternative definition of insider trading that generally prohibits
trading and tipping on the basis of material nonpublic information; it requires proof by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the trader or tipper knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the information
was material and nonpublic and that the information was obtained through a breach of a contrac-
tual, fiduciary, or other legal duty. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63, app. B, at 264.
Several commentators opposed the inclusion of a definition of insider trading in the ITSA. See,
e.g., 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 238-42 (statement of Ted J. Fiflis, Professor of Law,
University of Colorado Law School); id. at 197, 278-82 (statement of Arnold S. Jacobs); id. at 234-35
(statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
142. Section 1603 of the American Law Institute's proposal, 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES COD.
§ 1603 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ALI PROPOSAL] provides:
SEC. 1603. (a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the
issuer, if he knows a material fact with respect to the issuer or the security that is not
generally available, unless-
(1) the insider reasonably believes that the fact is generally available;
(2) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his agent) is known to the
insider and (A) the insider reasonably believes that that party (or his agent) knows the fact,
or (B) that party (or his agent) knows the fact from the insider or otherwise; or
(3) the insider proves that the fact is not a fact of special significance, except that this
defense is not available in an action or proceeding by the Commission under section 1809,
1810, 1811, 1812, 1815, or 1819(a).
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The section defines the category of persons who may be considered insid-
ers. In doing so, it clarifies one serious ambiguity in the present law.
That section, however, covers trading only by traditional insiders; other
fraudulent trading practices, which would include trading now covered
by the misappropriation theory, are dealt with in a broad antifraud provi-
sion much like Rule 10b-5. 143
Second, a task force of members of the Federal Regulation of Securi-
ties Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association drafted a proposed statute that was
directed at traditional insider trading as well as at other undesirable trad-
ing practices. The proposal proscribed trading by clearly defined classes
of insiders and fiduciaries. It also prohibited trading on the basis of mis-
appropriated information, relying on the version of the misappropriation
theory articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, 144which prohib-
ited the use of any information illegally acquired.145 The proposal did
(b) INSIDER.-For purposes of section 1603, "insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a di-
rector or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with,
the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to the
issuer, knows a material fact about the issuer or the security in question that is not gener-
ally available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact from a person within section 1603(b)
(including a person within section 1603(b)(4)) with knowledge that the person from whom
he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commission or a court finds that it would be
inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the purposes of this Code (including
the deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person within section 1603(b)(4) as if he were
within section 1603(b)(1), (2), or (3).
143. Section 1602(a) of the ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 142, provides:
SEC. 1602. (a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to
make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to
sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a proxy solicitation
or other circularization of security holders with respect to a security of a registrant, (3) a
tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in favor of or opposition to a tender
offer, or (4) any activity or proposed activity by an investment adviser with respect to a
client or a prospective client.
Reporters to the Code note in comment d to section 1603 that trading on material nonpublic
information by outsiders is left to section 1602 and to "further judicial development." Id. § 1603
comment d, at 663-64.
144. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 101.
145. Section 16A-Alternative A of the ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63, provides:
SUBSECTION (a). UNLAWFUL CONDUCT. It shall be unlawful, by use of any means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange:
(1) Insiders-For an insider to sell or buy a security if he knows a fact that is material
and nonpublic concerning the issuer or the security;
(2) Misappropriators-For any person to sell or buy any security if he knows a fact
that is material and nonpublic concerning the issuer or the security, and he misappropri-
ates such fact;
(3) Tippees-For a person to sell or buy a security if he learns a fact that he knows is
material and nonpublic concerning the issuer or the security from an insider, fiduciary or a
direct or indirect tippee of an insider or fiduciary or a direct or indirect tippee of an insider
or fiduciary with the knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is an insider,
fiduciary or a direct or indirect tippee of an insider or fiduciary;
(4) Tippers-For any insider, fiduciary or tippee of an insider or fiduciary to commu-
nicate to any other person a fact that is material and nonpublic concerning the issuer or the
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not define "misappropriation," but otherwise it went some distance to-
ward defining the boundaries of legality.
security, knowing that such communication is likely to result in trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information; provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply to a
communication made in good faith: (A) to any person in connection with the performance
by such person of his duties or obligations to the issuer; or (B) to any person pursuant to a
requirement of any statute or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder.
SUBSECTION (b). AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES-No person who purchases or sells a se-
curity ("trading person") shall be liable for violation of this Section if he sustains the bur-
den that:
(I) Knowledge of the Trading Person or Other Party-(A) The other party to the trans-
action knew the fact; or (B) such trading person reasonably believed that the fact was
public or was not material; or (C) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his
agent) was known to the trading person, and the trading person reasonably believed that
the other party (or his agent) knew the fact.
(2) Institutional Traders-Such trading person is other than a natural person, and that
(A) the individual making the investment decision on behalf of such trading person to
purchase or sell any security, or to cause any such security to be purchased or sold by or on
behalf of others, did not know the material fact; and (B) such trading person had imple-
mented one or a combination of policies and procedures, reasonable under the circum.
stances, taking into consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that an
individual making investment decisions would not violate this Section, which policies and
procedures may include, but are not limited to, (i) those which restricted any purchase, sale
and causing any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which prevent such
individuals from knowing such information.
(3) Supervening Cause-The purchase or sale was caused solely by factors other than.
the trading person's knowledge of the material fact.
SUBSECTION (c). DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this Section:
(1) "Insider" means: the issuer; a director or officer of or a person controlling, con-
trolled by, or under common control with, the issuer; a person who by virtue of his rela-
tionship or former relationship of trust or confidence to the issuer knows a material fact
about the issuer or the security that is not generally available.
(2) "Misappropriate" means (A) to obtain material, nonpublic information by unlaw-
ful means, or (B) to appropriate material, nonpublic information to one's own use or bene-
fit, or to the use or benefit of another person where, because of a fiduciary, contractual,
employee or other relationship, one is under a duty not so to appropriate it.
(3) A fact is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person
would consider it important under the circumstances in determining his course of action,
and (A) it would be likely on being made public to affect the market price of a security to a
significant extent, or (B) a reasonable person would consider it especially important under
the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such factors as degree
of its specificity, the extent of its difference from public information, and its nature and
reliability.
(4) A fact is "generally available" when such steps have been taken, and such time has
elapsed, that it can be reasonably anticipated that the fact is or should be known to inter-
ested investors in the relevant markets for the security in question.
(5) A "fact" includes (A) a promise, prediction, estimate, projection, or forecast, or(B) a statement of intention, motive, opinion, or law.
(6) "Knowledge, .... knows," "knowing" and "knowingly" include conduct that i
either knowing or reckless.
SUBSECTION (d). CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY--(1) A person who controlled a
person liable under this Section at the time of any act giving rise to liability is liable to the
same extent as the controlled person; provided, however, that a controlling person is not
liable under this Section if he proves that he reasonably did not know that the controlled
person traded on the basis of or tipped material, nonpublic information; and (2) no person
shall be liable for violating this Section solely by reason of employing another person who
is so liable, if (A) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such
procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practica-
ble, any such violation by such other person, and (B) such person has reasonably dis-
charged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and system were nqt being
complied with.
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Similar in scope to the ABA Task Force proposal were a draft bill
submitted by Senator D'Amato and a substantially similar provision
drafted by Milton V. Freeman and presented to Congress.146 These
SUBSECTION (e). CAUSING OR ASSISTING A VIOLATION-Any person who knowingly
causes or gives substantial assistance to conduct by another person liable under this Section
("a principal") with knowledge that the conduct is unlawful or involves trading on the
basis of or tipping material or nonpublic information is liable as a principal.
SUBSECTION (f). BURDEN OF PROOF--No person shall be liable under this Section
unless such liability is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.
SUBSECTION (g). PRIVATE REMEDIES IN FACE-TO-FACE TRANSACTIONS ....
SUBSECTION (h). PRIVATE REMEDIES IN MARKET TRANSACTIONS ....
SUBSECTION (i). MEASURE OF DAMAGES ....
SUBSECTION (j). TIPPERS AND TIPPEE-Any person who tips a fact that is material
and not public in violation of Subsection (a)(4) to a tippee within the meaning of Subsec-
tion (a)(3) shall be liable under Subsections (g) and (h) to the same extent as the tippee.
SUBSECTION (k). COSTS ....
SUBSECTION (1). PENALTIES-() Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that
any person has violated this Section in a transaction which is not part of a public offering
by an issuer of securities other than standardized options, the Commission may, in addition
to the remedies provided in Section 21 of this title, commence an action in a United States
District Court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be
paid by such person.
(2) The amount of such penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts
and circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a
result of such violation and shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States.
(3) If a person upon whom such penalty is imposed shall fail to pay such penalty
within the time prescribed in the court's order, the Commission may refer the matter to the
Attorney General, who may recover such penalty by action in the appropriate United
States District Court. The Commission, by rule or regulation, may exempt from the provi-
sions of this paragraph any class of persons or transactions.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, "profit gained" or "loss avoided" is the difference
between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security as mea-
sured by the trading price of the security a reasonable period after the fact becomes gener-
ally available.
SUBSECTION (m). LIMITATIONS-NO damages may be awarded as provided in Sub-
sections (g) and (h) of this Section, and no penalty may be imposed under Subsection (1) of
this Section for violations of this Section engaged in more than five years after the date of
such violation.
SUBSECTION (n). EXCLUSivrry-No action shall be maintained under Section 10(b)
of this title for the conduct made unlawful herein, unless the defendant acts with an intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63, app. A, at 259-63; see also id app. B, at 263, reproduced
supra note 141 (Task Force's alternative to its definition of unlawful conduct contained in subsection
(a) of Alternative A supra).
146. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 8, 81:
Draft of Legislation Proposed by Senator D'Amato
Sec. 1
Section 16(0. To Make Unlawful Unfair Use of Information.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who is in possession of material nonpublic
information of such a character as may reasonably be expected immediately upon disclo-
sure substantially to affect the price of the securities of such issuer to profit from such
information or avoid loss by purchasing or selling such securities or any securities, convert-
ible into or exchangeable for such securities or options or rights to obtain or dispose of
such securities, or to aid and abet any such person so to profit or avoid loss, if he employs
the information in violation of his own fiduciary or contractual obligations, or if to his
knowledge the information is imparted to him in violation of the fiduciary or contractual
obligations of the person imparting such information to him.
(b) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (a) to the contrary, the following transac-
tions shall not be in violations [sic] of paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Purchases of any security described in paragraph (a) by a broker or by another
agent on behalf of an offering person; or
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drafts premised liability on the misappropriation theory developed by the
SEC in enforcement actions. 147
Finally, the Securities Industry Association proposed a restrictive
version of the prohibition against insider trading. Its draft limited the
scope of unlawful use of inside information by prohibiting only the use of
corporate, as opposed to market, information. This proposal did not pe-
nalize conduct to which the misappropriation theory applies, and thus
would have eliminated some of the concern over the fuzzy edges of the
law. 14
8
(2) Sales by any person of any security described in paragraph (a) to the offering
person.
(c) No person shall be subject to a sanction under subsection (a) of this section solely
because that person aided and abetted a transaction covered by it in a manner other than
by communicating material nonpublic information. Section 20 of this title shall not apply
to actions brought under subsection (a) of this section. No person shall be liable under
subsection (a) of this section solely by reason of employing another person who is liable
under such subsection.
A person other than a natural person that employs another person who is liable under
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable if such person shows that:
(1) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of such person to
purchase or sell any security described in subsection (a) did not know the material nonpub-
lic information; or
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures,
reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person's
business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate sub-
section (a), which policies and procedures may include, but are not limited to, (i) those
which restrict any purchase or sale of any such security or (ii) those which prevent such
individual(s) from knowing such information.
(d) It shall not be necessary to establish a violation of this Section 16(f) that the acts
made unlawful be proved to be done with any purpose to deceive, manipulate or defraud
investors but only that the use of information was unfair as violating an express or implied
obligation.
(e) Any person violating this section shall forfeit the amount of the profit gained or the
loss avoided and shall pay an amount determined by the court in light of the facts and
circumstances up to three times the amount of the profit gained or the loss avoided into the
Treasury of the United States upon order of a United States District Court in an action
commenced by the Commission under Section 21(a).
For purposes of this paragraph "profit gained" or "loss avoided" is the difference
between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security as mea-
sured by the trading price of the security a reasonable period after public dissemination of
the nonpublic information.
(f) This section is in addition to any other provision of law and, particularly, shall not
be deemed in any way to restrict the scope of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of this Act and the
rules promulgated thereunder.
147. See supra note 146.
148. The Securities Industry Association's Federal Regulation Committee's Draft, 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 14, at 220, provides:
2) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person . . . has knowingly
purchased or sold . . . or caused to be purchased or sold, a security, based on material
nonpublic corporate information in a transaction (i) on or through the facilities of a na.
tional securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and (ii) which is not part
of a public offering by an issuer of securities other than standardized options, and that such
purchase or sale. . . violated Section 78j(b) or 78n(e) of this title or the rules or the regula.
tions thereunder, the Commission may bring an action within. . . two years from the date
of such purchase or sale in a United States District Court to seek, and the court shall have
jurisdiction to impose, upon finding the existence of such a. . . violation, a civil penalty to
be paid by such person . . . . The amount of such penalty and the person or persons
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Each of these proposals had inherent weaknesses. Some were re-
jected as too broad, others as too narrow. A narrow definition, like that
of the Securities Industry Association, would have hindered the SEC's
enforcement activities, and so worked against Congress's very purpose in
adopting the ITSA. 149 Moreover, the Commission was concerned that a
narrow definition in the ITSA would be applied in cases other than those
in which the SEC sought treble damages under the ITSA.t50 A broad
definition, such as that proposed by Senator D'Amato, would have had
the benefit of not restricting the SEC's enforcement function, but would
have done little to add clarity and predictability to the law. 151 Any defi-
nition would introduce new terms that could give rise to ambiguities and,
thus, litigation. This potential for injecting additional uncertainty into
the law governing insider trading weighed heavily against the merits of
any of the proposed definitions.152
Still, a definition would have been helpful and elucidative. In the
area of what traditionally has been prohibited insider trading-cases in
which an insider trades on the basis of material nonpublic information-
defining the prohibited conduct would not have been difficult.' 53 The
proposed ALI Federal Securities Code contains such a definition.154 In
cases outside the sphere of this activity, defining the prohibited conduct
would have put to rest the issue of the validity of the misappropriation
against whom the penalty shall be assessed shall be determined by the court in light of the
facts and circumstances, but the amount of such penalty imposed . . . shall not in the
aggregate exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided by . . . such person as a
result of such unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury of the
United States. If a person upon whom such a penalty is imposed shall fail to pay such
penalty within the time prescribed in the court's order, the Commission may refer the
matter to the Attorney General who may recover such penalty by action in the appropriate
United States District Court. The actions authorized by this paragraph may be brought in
addition to any other actions that the Commission or the Attorney General are entitled to
bring. . . . For purposes of Section 27 of this title, actions under this paragraph shall be
actions to enforce a liability or a duty created by this title. The Commission, by rule or
regulation, may exempt from the provisions of this paragraph any class of persons or trans-
actions.
(emphasis added).
See also Karsch, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act: Incorporating A Market Information Definition,
6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L. 283, 294-97 (1984) (discussing Great Britain's attempt to
regulate insider trading).
149. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 8-9.
150. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 54-57 (statement of Rep. Wirth).
151. See id. at 238-42 (statement of Ted J. Fiflis).
152. "[Tlhere is the legitimate concern that a definition with new terms and its legislative history
would create new ambiguities, thereby increasing rather than limiting uncertainty. This will mean a
decade of vigorous and expensive litigation over the new terms used by Congress." 1984 Senate
Hearings, supra note 14, at 36 (statement of John Fedders).
153. See, e.g., 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 51 (comment of SEC Chairman Shad)
("[I]n my opinion it would be possible to define who is an insider and what would be involved in
both company and market information.")
154. See, e.g., ALI PROPOSAL § 1603, supra note 142.
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theory. Views expressed in the legislative history of the Act suggest that
Congress considered unlawful any use of material nonpublic information
that was obtained by illegitimate means.15 5 Given that clear expression
of intent and the prevailing criticism of the misappropriation theory, it
would have been desirable to eliminate questions about the scope of the
law by doing more than adopting a new remedy. The definition could
have given validity to the misappropriation theory and resolved some of
the issues relating to its application. While it is true that any definition
included in the ITSA might have lacked the flexibility necessary to en-
compass a novel theory of liability that the Commission might put forth
in an enforcement action, the SEC could have reverted to reliance on
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in such a case. Furthermore, using the
ITSA to support novel theories of liability may be inappropriate.' 5 6
Since the ITSA authorizes a penalty for the prohibited conduct, one may
cogently argue for a clear definition of what is prohibited, even if the
scope of prohibited conduct is slightly narrower than the scope of the
judicially interpreted implied cause of action.
Without a definition of insider trading to resolve uncertainties about
what uses of material nonpublic information are unlawful, the ITSA's
treble damages sanction could be imposed when the defendant did not
and could not have known that his conduct violated the federal securities
laws. Imposing the penalty under such circumstances raises concerns
about fair notice and efficiency of regulation. 157 There are two aspects to
155. See, eg., 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 2 (statement of Sen. D'Amato); id. at 32-
35 (comments of Sen. D'Amato and John Fedders). The Committee intentionally left the judicial
development of what constitutes insider trading undisturbed for fear that a statutory definition
would either have little effect or would create "gaping holes" through which traders engaged in
questionable activities could escape. Concerns over limiting the definition of insider trading, reme-
dying the Court's narrow interpretation of existing law in Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), and leaving
unimpaired "legitimate business transactions" imply that Congress intended to outlaw profitable use
of material nonpublic information gained by any illicit means. See HousE REPORT, supra note 31, at
13-15, 13 n.20 (supporting misappropriation theory as used in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983)); see also Newman, 664 F.2d at 22 n.34 (SEC
comments).
156. See infra notes 157-89 and accompanying text.
157. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20 (Reacting to Justice Blackmun's dissent, the Court said,
"[A] judicial holding that certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by § 10(b) would
raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants would be given fair notice that they have
engaged in illegal activity.") (citation omitted); see also 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 52
(comments of Sen. Rinaldo, SEC Chairman Shad and John Fedders); id. at 289 (statement of
Michael R. Klein) (indicating lack of clarity in the law of insider trading); Freeman, Legislative
Action Called "Desirable" for Resolution of Insider Trading Problems, 10 S.E.C. '82, reprinted in
1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 187, 193-94 ("In any event to use the securities laws to
protect the reputation of bankers where no investors appear to have been cheated seems like a suffi-
ciently unusual application of the statute designed to protect investors to raise questions about
whether the criminal law is an appropriate weapon to that effect, especially if it be conceded that
there must be by statute a 'clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed.' See [United
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the concern that fair notice of the scope of prohibited conduct be given
before a defendant is subjected to a treble damages penalty for insider
trading. First, due process requires that a law be sufficiently clear to
provide notice to a reasonable person of the standard of illegitimate con-
duct.' 58 The due process requirement of notice underlies the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, by which a court must hold void any statute or legal
rule that fails adequately to articulate an ascertainable standard of pro-
hibited conduct. A statute or rule may be void on its face if it fails to give
adequate notice of what is proscribed.1 59 Alternatively, while not ambig-
uous on its face, a rule or statute may be found to violate due process as
applied to a specific fact situation.160
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have withstood attacks of facial inva-
lidity based on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, 61 but the doctrine none-
theless might prevent their application to a defendant in a specific case.
If liability were based upon an unanticipated and drastic departure from
existing law governing the standards of illegal activity, due process con-
siderations would come into play to protect the defendant from liability
based on lack of notice of the new legal principle. 162 Of course, to violate
due process the departure from precedent would have to be something
other than a logical extension of previous articulations of the law. For
example, the void-for-vagueness doctrine would have applied in
Chiarella if liability in that case had been premised on the discrepancy
between Chiarella's and the investors' access to confidential information,
as suggested by Justice Blackmun's dissent.' 63
States v. Persky,] 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1975)."); Karsch, supra note 148, at 291 (if treble
damages penalty of ITSA "[is] to be fairly applied, then traders should have notice of what consti-
tutes a violation").
158. See, eg., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
159. See, eg., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (holding invalid, as vague
on its face, ordinance that made it criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble. . . on
any of the sidewalks . . . and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by").
160. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971) (holding "suspicious person"
ordinance void as applied).
161. United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975).
162. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; see infra note 163.
163. Justice Blackmun would have held that Chiarella's access to the material nonpublic infor-
mation gave rise to a duty not to use such information for his personal gain. He stated, "I would
hold that persons having access to confidential material information that is not legally available to
others generally are prohibited by Rule lOb-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural
informational advantage through trading in affected securities." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
The majority in Chiarella expressed concern that Justice Blackmun's suggested standard of
illegal conduct would violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine: "Additionally, a judicial holding that
certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by § 10(b) would raise questions whether either
criminal or civil defendants would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity." Id.
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Apart from due process considerations, a court in an individual case
may protect a defendant from an abrupt change in the law by refusing to
apply the newly created rule retroactively. The nonretroactivity doctrine
is not founded on the Constitution, but rests instead on notions of funda-
mental fairness. 164 Like the due process requirement of notice, the non-
retroactivity doctrine has been applied in civil as well as criminal
cases.165
In the criminal context, if a case announces a new rule and the rule
is "a clear break with the past,"' 166 the court will consider "the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
. ..the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards."' 67 "Once the Court has found that the new rule
was unanticipated, the second and third . . . factors-reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards and effect on the adminis-
tration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule-have virtu-
ally compelled a finding of nonretroactivity."' 68
In the civil context, courts consider three factors. First, if the deci-
sion is to be applied only prospectively, it must establish "a new princi-
ple of law."'169 Second, the court must determine the purpose of the new
rule of law and whether retroactive application "will further or retard its
operation."' 70 Third, the court must assess the hardship resulting from a
retroactive application of the new rule. 171
An example of a criminal case in which the issue of nonretroactivity
at 235 n.20 (citation omitted). See generally Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Stat-
utes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948).
164. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 (1982). On the nonretroactivity doctrine, see
generally R. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.04
(1982); Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability,
and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Note, Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
165. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
166. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969).
167. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). The Court in Stovall articulated the initial
inquiry as "the purpose to be served by the new standards," id. at 297; in United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 551-54 (1982), the Court seemed to reformulate this initial inquiry to consist of an
analysis of the degree to which the new rule broke with the past. In Johnson, however, the Court did
consider whether the new rule was aimed at furthering the truth-finding aspects of trial, id. tit 555,
and presumably would have applied the rule retroactively to the case at bar had it answered that
question in the affirmative.
168. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982) (citations omitted).
169. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). The new principle may arise as a result
of "overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue
of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 107 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
171. Id.
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might have appropriately been raised is United States v. Newman. 172
Newman was one of three co-conspirators convicted for engaging in in-
sider trading on the basis of information gained from an investment
banking firm, Morgan Stanley, about proposed mergers and acquisitions.
The three co-conspirators purchased stock in companies that were
targets of acquisitions proposed by Morgan Stanley's clients, and profited
by using the information about the proposed transactions before the ac-
quisitions were publicly announced. Newman's conduct closely resem-
bled Chiarella's: Chiarella used information gained from his employer;
Newman, from his co-conspirator's employer; and neither had any rela-
tionship to other traders in the securities.
Although Justice Stevens had discussed the misappropriation theory
in his concurrence in Chiarella, prior to Newman the theory had never
provided a basis for either civil or criminal liability under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. Likewise, although long-standing principles of agency
law recognized the duty of an employee to his employer not to use confi-
dential information for personal gain, 173 prior to Newman breach of that
duty had never afforded grounds for liability under the securities laws.
In fact, the Court in Chiarella-like Newman, a criminal case--empha-
sized that under section 10(b) one's duty was to those purchasing or sell-
ing securities at the same time in the market. 174 Obviously, Newman
owed no duty to purchasers and sellers of the stock in which he traded
since he had no relationship to them. 175 Nonetheless, the court found
that the purchaser/seller requirement related merely to the issue of
standing, and so did not pertain in a criminal prosecution. 176 The court
had no difficulty switching its focus from a duty owed to other share-
holders to one owed to a nonshareholder-employer as the basis for liabil-
ity under section 10(b).
The question of retroactivity apparently was not raised in New-
man, 177 but the case was an appropriate one in which to apply the non-
retroactivity doctrine. The court announced a new rule: The basis of a
172. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); cf Note, supra note 124, at
864-65 (criticizing Newman as a violation of due process notice).
173. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
175. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16 (footnote omitted):
We hold that appellee's conduct. . . could be found to constitute a criminal violation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 despite the fact that neither Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb nor
their clients was at the time a purchaser or seller of the target company securities in any
transaction with any of the defendants."
176. Id. at 17 ("The district court's statement that fraud perpetrated upon purchasers or sellers
of securities is a 'requisite element under the securities laws' is, therefore, an overbroad and incorrect
summary of the law.").
177. The court implicitly rejected a due process claim of inadequate notice. Id. at 19.
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breach of duty under section 10(b) could be a duty owed to a person
whom the defendant's conduct did not deceive in relation to a trading
decision.178 The reliance concern of retroactivity is inapposite here, be-
cause enforcement officials did not rely on the preexisting state of the law
in the investigation process. 179 Finally, the effect of nonretroactivity on
the administration of justice would have been negligible in Newman. The
rule would have deterred future misconduct equally well if not applied to
Newman, although, of course, Newman himself would have been
freed. 180 Balancing an individual's interest in having notice of the law
against the government's interest in penalizing illegal behavior, the pro-
tection of the individual should prevail in a case like this, in which only a
financial wrong has been done and no private claim of injury has been
made.
If Newman had been a civil action for treble damages under the
ITSA, an argument for nonretroactivity also might have prevailed. In
such a case, the civil standard for determining when a decision should
not operate retroactively would govern, since the ITSA purports to im-
pose a civil sanction.18' The legal principle on which liability was based
in Newman created an unprecedented change in the standards of legiti-
mate conduct, and thus the first factor in the analysis is satisfied. The
second consideration relevant to the issue of nonretroactivity in a civil
action is whether a nonretroactive application of the new principle of law
will further or retard the purpose of the new rule. The purpose of the
misappropriation theory is to deter a broadened sphere of activity. 82
Deterrence has two aspects: specific deterrence of an identified individ-
ual, and general deterrence of potential violators of the law.' 83 Although
178. The newness of the rule was discussed by the district court in United States v. Courtois,
[1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,296 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'dsub nor. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983):
I conclude that there was no 'clear and definite statement' in the federal securities laws
which both antedated and proscribed the acts alleged in this indictment. As of the times
alleged, neither courts, commentators, nor the SEC in its rule-making or enforcement ca-
pacities had stated that Rule lOb-5 extended to a noninsider's breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to the acquiring corporation in a tender offer.
See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
179. Reliance by law enforcement officials might be significant in a case involving an issue of
search and seizure under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,
549-50 (1982).
180. Newman still could have been subject to a civil enforcement action by the Commission
pursuant to section 21 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
181. But see infra notes 248-69 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that ITSA's sanc-
tion is criminal, not civil).
182. That is, the misappropriation theory is used to enlarge the sphere of activity that is prohib-
ited by Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3.
183. For a description of general and specific deterrence see W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 22-23 (1972) (discussing "general" and "particular" deterrence).
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a nonretroactive application of the misappropriation theory would not
serve the purpose of specific deterrence, it would further the goal of gen-
eral deterrence. Nonretroactive application would leave Newman un-
punished by the treble damages penalty for his conduct, but would place
other potential violators on notice of the broader reach of Rule lOb-5.
Moreover, the hardship that would result from a retroactive application
of the new rule might be significant in financial terms. Finally, defend-
ants whose conduct violates previously unarticulated legal principles do
not necessarily act with the degree of culpability sufficient to warrant the
deterrence intended by the ITSA. t 84 In contrast, if the SEC seeks and
obtains disgorgement rather than a penalty, the defendant suffers less fi-
nancial hardship. Therefore, a retroactive application of the new theory
of liability might be appropriate in actions for disgorgement but inappro-
priate in actions for assessment of the ITSA's penalty.
85
As a result of the uncertainty in the law about what constitutes un-
lawful insider trading and the absence of a definition of the prohibited
conduct in the ITSA, a defendant may incur liability without fair notice
that his conduct was illegal. When a reasonable person in the defend-
ant's position would not have known that his conduct violated the insider
trading laws, and when the defendant in fact did not know that his activ-
ity was illegal, the imposition of the treble damages penalty raises the
questions whether due process prohibits liability and whether application
of the nonretroactivity doctrine would be appropriate.
186
184. In other words, the defendants did not know the legal boundaries, and therefore did not
realize that their conduct was unlawful. See infra text accompanying notes 278-86.
185. Even though the rule of liability would still be unprecedented, the burden resulting from a
retroactive application of the new rule would be less significant if only disgorgement was sought.
This decrease in the burden might be enough to shift the balance in favor of a retroactive application
of the new rule. See Committee on Legislation, New York State Bar Association, Report ofAntitrust
Section, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 395 (1982) (recommending only single, instead of treble, damages for
antitrust violations where reasonable person could not have known that defendant's conduct violated
law; Committee indicated that "'foreseeability' may be lacking where the law has changed or where
there is substantial disagreement among judicial bodies") [hereinafter cited as N. Y. State Bar Anti-
trust Report]; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 52 (statement of Rep. Rinaldo) ("What you are
telling us is that under the present scheme of things, absent this legislation [ITSA], no definition is
necessary because in effect the only result, when a person is guilty of insider trading, can be disgorge-
ment. There is no punitive penalty."); see also Anderson, supra note 124, at 374-77 (concluding that
Chiarella was correctly decided, because the class to which Chiarella belonged, financial printers,
does not generally have control over the timing and content of a corporation's disclosure, nor does
such class generally deal with investing public in a way that inspires trust). Professor Anderson
would limit the class of persons subject to liability for insider trading to corporate insiders and
market professionals. Therefore, Newman might be covered by her theory, since he was an em-
ployee of an investment banking firm and thus a member of the securities industry. See id.
186. An analogy between the civil liability provisions of the antitrust laws and the ITSA might
be drawn. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), provides that "any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, includ-
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Courts should liberally apply these doctrines to protect defendants
from the treble damages penalty of the ITSA, because other enforcement
mechanisms will still be available against such defendants. For example,
if the nonretroactivity doctrine precludes assessment of treble damages in
a particular case, the defendant can still be required to disgorge the prof-
its. Furthermore, by announcing the new rule of liability, courts will be
serving the general deterrence purpose of the Act. Thus, even though
application of these doctrines may permit certain defendants "one free
bite," it does not unduly burden the enforcement efforts of the Commis-
sion. At the same time, it protects defendants from arbitrary punish-
ment. Moreover, imposition of the penalty based on a novel legal
principle fulfills no specific deterrence purpose; defendants cannot alter
their behavior as a result of the threat of a treble damages penalty that
they cannot foresee.
Predicating liability for treble damages on a novel approach to the
law regulating insider trading not only offends fair notice doctrines, it is
also an inefficient method of regulation. Although it deters the conduct
that the legislature intended to prohibit, it might also deter other conduct
considered lawful by the legislature. Persons uncertain of the scope of
the prohibited conduct might forego lawful action out of fear that their
assessment of the conduct's legality was inaccurate. "[In the absence of]
clarity concerning the conduct to which the penalty applies, legitimate
activity may be foregone, and heavy compliance expenses incurred, all
ultimately as costs borne by the investing public."' 87 Thus, it is ineffi-
cient and costly to punish activity that is not clearly prohibited. More-
over, the lack of a definition of insider trading may discourage a person
charged with unlawful activity and faced with the possibility of having to
pay treble damages from litigating legitimate factual issues. Instead, the
defendant may be overly encouraged to settle the case for an amount less
ing a reasonable attorney's fee." Several significant distinctions between the ITSA and section 4 of
the Clayton Act are immediately apparent. First, section 4 authorizes treble damages recovery for a
private plaintiff, whereas under the ITSA the penalty is not available to individuals injured by the
illegal trade. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Second, treble damages are mandatory
under section 4, whereas the amount of the penalty is discretionary under the ITSA. See infra notes
241-47 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized that treble damages under the
antitrust laws may be inappropriate when new decisions "constitute a sharp break in the line of
earlier authority, or an avulsive change which causes the current of the law thereafter to flow be-
tween new banks." Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968); see also
Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 445 (1985); N.Y State Bar Antitrust
Report, supra note 185, at 385 (recommending that the law "be amended to limit the remedy [under
section 4 of the Clayton Act] to single damages where a defendant could not reasonably have known
it was violating the law").
187. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 41 (memorandum to Chairman Shad from the Of-
fice ofthe General Counsel of the SEC). The maximum criminal monetary penalty under section 32,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. Il 1984), is $100,000.
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than three times the amount of the profit gained or loss avoided.1 88
Hasty settlements prompted by the ambiguity of the prohibited sphere of
activity ultimately chill legitimate behavior of others and cause payment
by those who have not violated the law and who should not be deterred
from engaging in similar conduct in the future.1 89
D. Standard of Proof.
The ambiguity of the definition of unlawful insider trading is com-
pounded by the minimum standard of proof that Congress prescribed for
actions under the ITSA. In the legislative history of the ITSA, Congress
stated that the burden of proof in a treble damages action should be "a
preponderance of the evidence," the burden normally applicable in civil
litigation. 90
The SEC had proposed this standard during the congressional com-
mittee hearings on the Act. Prior to enactment of the ITSA the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard applied in private civil actions for
violations of the securities laws as well as in suits by the SEC for injunc-
tive relief.'9 1
The Commission urged two reasons why this standard was appro-
priate in cases brought under the ITSA. First, the preponderance of the
evidence standard is consistent with the purpose of increasing deterrence.
A higher standard of proof makes it more difficult for the Commission to
succeed in an enforcement action. 192 Congress found this argument com-
pelling and cited it as its reason for deeming the preponderance standard
188. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEC MAJOR ISSUES CONFERENCE 42 (June 28-29, 1984) (report
of comments of Professor Homer Kripke on the ITSA):
Professor Kripke expressed concern, however, regarding the treble damage proposal. The
mere prospect of a treble damage proceeding will chill a prospective defendant's willing-
ness to litigate legitimate factual issues, such as whether information was material or non-
public, or legitimate legal issues. Without a definition of insider trading, both the staff and
the respondent know that the risks to the respondent of litigating will be much greater than
negotiating a consent decree.
189. The defendant whose conduct was not unlawful should not be discouraged. See 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 14, at 29 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) ("In order to avoid the imposition
of unintended compliance expenses, which are ultimately borne by the investing public, the Commis-
sion recognizes the need for legislation to be clear, unambiguous and predictable in its interpretation
and application.")
190. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 (1983) (footnote omitted):
Some commentators expressed the view that, in light of the potential for a large penalty,
the appropriate burden of proof. . . should be more than the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard applicable to Commission injunctive actions. The Committee rejects this
notion because a higher proof standard could hamper Commission penalty actions.
191. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
192. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 46 (memorandum from the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the SEC to Chairman Shad):
A higher burden of proof, such as a clear and convincing standard, would make it more
difficult for the Commission to prove its case, particularly in insider trading cases where
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applicable.1 93 Second, the Commission expressed concern that a trial
could become confusing if two standards applied in a single factual situa-
tion: preponderance of the evidence to requests for injunctive and dis-
gorgement relief, and a higher standard to the request for the treble
damages penalty. 194 Such a dual standard in a single case could indeed
cause confusion by requiring inconsistent judgments whenever the SEC
proves its case by a preponderance of the evidence but no more. Only a
district court judge, however, not a jury, would need to apply both stan-
dards, for there is no right to a jury trial on the disgorgement and injunc-
tion claims.19 5 Because a judge would be intimately familiar with the
difference in the two standards of proof, the concern about confusion is
negligible.
There are, in contrast, significant reasons why a preponderance of
the evidence may be too low a standard for imposing a treble damages
penalty. The burden of proof constitutionally required in a civil or
criminal proceeding is determined by reference to due process
considerations:1 96
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication." The standard serves to allocate the risk of error
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached
to the ultimate decision. 197
Thus, the preponderance of the evidence standard, the burden generally
imposed in actions for monetary damages between private litigants, re-
flects society's minimal concern about the outcome of such suits.198 It
most cases are built on circumstancial [sic] evidence. A higher standard of proof would
therefore substantially reduce the deterrent impact of the proposed sanction.
See also id. at 62-64 (comments of Rep. Dingell and John Fedders); id. at 95-96 (letter from SEC
Chairman Shad to Rep. Wirth).
193. See supra note 192.
194. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 97 (letter from Chairman Shad to Rep. Wirth).
195. See infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V. On the issue of the standard of proof, see generally Kadish, Meth-
odology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957);
McBaine, Burdens of Proof Degrees ofBelief 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242, 251-58 (1944).
197. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted)).
198. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. For common law fraud, which is similar to an action under
Rule 10b-5, the appropriate burden is proof by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Fox v.
Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1976) (jury to find proof of fraud only upon clear
and convincing evidence); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 340, at 796.
97 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). But see Household Fin. Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St. 2d 190, 193, 214
N.E.2d 667, 669 (1966) (in civil case where money damages are sought, proof of fraud by preponder-
ance of the evidence will suffice). Cases brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3731 (1982), also must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Ekelman &
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allocates the risk of an erroneous judgment almost equally between plain-
tiff and defendant. In contrast, the highest burden of proof, "beyond a
reasonable doubt," applies in criminal actions, reflecting society's great
concern that judgments involving possible loss of liberty or life be
accurate. 199
An intermediate standard of proof, requiring that the defendant's
guilt be proven by clear and convincing evidence, has been required in
cases in which the interests at stake are deemed to be "more substantial
than mere loss of money. ' 200 For example, due process may require this
intermediate burden when an adverse judgement would injure the de-
fendant's reputation. 20'
In Santosky v. Kramer,20 2 the Supreme Court articulated three fac-
tors to be assessed in determining the appropriate burden of proof: "the
private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by
the. . . chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure. ' 20 3 If these three factors are
applied to a hypothetical case in which treble damages are sought pursu-
ant to the ITSA, they indicate that the clear and convincing evidence
standard, rather than the preponderance standard, should be used.
The first consideration focuses on the private interest at stake in the
proceeding. In an action under the ITSA, the most obvious potential
deprivation at stake is the "damage to the defendant's pocketbook. ' '20 4
The Act authorizes courts to assess a potentially devastating sum, up to
three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided on the illegal
trade. Indeed, in many cases this amount could exceed the maximum
criminal fine allowed for the same conduct. 20 5 Even when the court exer-
cises its discretion under the Act to assess a penalty less than the maxi-
mum amount, 20 6 the impact of the penalty will almost certainly be
Assocs., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1975); Hageny v. United States, 570 F.2d 924, 933 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
199. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
200. Id. at 424 (articulating middle standard of proof as "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal," and
"convincing").
201. Id.
202. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Santosky decided what standard of proof was required when the state
(there, New York) sought to terminate parental rights upon a finding of neglect. Id. at 752-70.
203. Id. at 754 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981)).
204. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L.
REV. 269, 278 (1983).
205. The maximum criminal monetary penalty under the 1934 Act as amended by the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. I 1984), is $100,000; see also Coffee,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1158 (1984) ("[T]he goal of policy planning should
be to optimize the level of deterrence, not maximize it.").
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
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significant.
In addition to the potential financial loss in an action under the
ITSA, damage to the defendant's reputation is also likely to result from
an adverse judgment. It has been argued that any defendant in a private
civil action who is judged to owe punitive as well as compensatory dam-
ages will suffer stigma as a result of the judgment.20 7 Punitive damages
are awarded in private tort actions only upon a finding of scienter or
recklessness, which evidences the culpability of the defendant. 20 8 The
very name of the award implies the intent to punish and suggests that a
defendant found liable for punitive damages deserves punishment. 20 9
A similar loss of reputation is at stake when the Commission seeks
the treble damages penalty under the ITSA. Like liability for punitive
damages, liability for the ITSA's penalty represents a finding that the
defendant deserves punishment.210 Both depend on proof of scienter or
recklessness. 2t1 Moreover, the SEC and Congress dubbed inside traders
"thieves," 212 an epithet certainly more characteristic of criminal than of
civil defendants. And that the plaintiff in an ITSA action is a govern-
mental agency rather than a private citizen makes the case that stigmati-
zation results from liability even stronger. The SEC has vowed to devote
increased attention and resources to enforcement of the insider trading
laws, and the consequences of its enforcement efforts have been increas-
ingly publicized. 21 3 These additional factors prove that the concern for
207. Wheeler, supra note 204, at 280 ("The defendant has more to lose in a punitive damages
proceeding, however, than the monetary penalty he may be ordered to pay. An adverse judgment
will also stigmatize him.").
208. Id. at 282 & nn.66-73.
209. Id. at 282 ("Thus, a punitive damages award, unlike a compensatory award, seems always
to constitute a 'badge of disgrace' and to jeopardize the defendant's good name, reputation, honor,
and integrity.").
210. See HousE REPORT, supra note 31, at 8 (1983) ("The Committee believes the new penalty
provided by the legislation will serve as a powerful deterrent to insider trading abuses.").
211. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
212. "We must provide a sufficient deterrent so that people will think twice before they engage in
what all of us would call thievery." (emphasis added) 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 2
(statement of Rep. Wirth); see also id. at 61. The term originates from Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in Chiarella, where he stated, "In sum, the evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working
literally in the shadows of the warning signs [of his employer] in the printshop misappropriated-
stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
213. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 18 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) ("In
order to curtail and deter insider trading, the Commission has sharply increased the number of
enforcement actions against such conduct."); Wayne, Inside Trading by Outsiders, N.Y. Times, May
27, 1984, § F, at 1, 21 (commenting on Commission's willingness to "seek cases that have high
publicity value."); Note, supra note 31, at 467 (commenting on the Commission's practice of prose-
cuting "high visibility cases to maximize the publicity and the resulting deterrence from each case")
(footnote omitted).
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the defendant's reputation is significant in an action under the ITSA-
indeed, more significant than in a private lawsuit in which punitive dam-
ages are imposed.
The second factor to be considered in determining the proper stan-
dard of proof is the risk of error created by the traditional procedure-
that is, the risk of error created by the preponderance of the evidence
standard-and the likelihood that a higher burden of proof would reduce
that risk.214 According to the Court in Santosky, this inquiry focuses on
whether the preponderance of the evidence standard "fairly allocates the
risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties. '215
Several considerations are relevant to an analysis of this factor.
First, the SEC and the typical defendant differ significantly in their abil-
ity to pursue the litigation. The SEC's litigation resources are not prede-
termined, while those of an individual defendant may well be.216
Second, while the Act directs judges to exercise discretion in estab-
lishing the actual amount of the penalty, it does not provide any guide-
lines for deciding when an amount less than the maximum penalty is
appropriate. Because the SEC currently intends to seek the maximum
penalty in most cases, 217 there is a risk that the penalty imposed could be
greater than the amount necessary for deterrence.218 Further, the Com-
mission may use the threat of a treble damages penalty to induce the
defendant to settle for an amount less than the maximum penalty; the
lack of guidelines for determining the penalty will make it more difficult
for a defendant accurately to assess the risk that the maximum penalty
will be imposed if the case proceeds to trial.219
Finally, the relative interests of the SEC and the defendant in avoid-
ing an erroneous decision are not equal. The SEC's interest is limited to
the enforcement of the securities laws in the particular case before the
court. It does not gain financially from the penalty, nor is it entitled to
Santosky also considered significant the permanence of the loss. Of course, the ITSA's treble
damages penalty entails a permanent loss of money. The stigma resulting from a judgment under
the Act, however, may lessen over time. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
214. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761-62.
215. Id. at 761.
216. The Santosky Court found relevant a discrepancy in parties' litigation resources. See id. at
763-64.
217. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 25 n.48 (memorandum accompanying letter of SEC
Chairman Shad to Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill).
218. See Coffee, supra note 205, at 1158; Diver, supra note 20, at 1458. Diver argues that if the
sanction is too low, illegitimate conduct will not be discouraged; if the sanction is too high, legiti-
mate and beneficial conduct will be discouraged. "Only by reference to a set of standards can one
determine whether a particular penalty is too low or too high." Id.
219. See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
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the penalty. 220 The defendant, in contrast, has an interest in avoiding
payment of the penalty and avoiding the stigma that would result from
the imposition of the penalty. Because the SEC has no corresponding
interest in gaining the treble damages, the defendant's interests in avoid-
ing an erroneous judgment outweigh those of the Commission.221
The final factor cited by Santosky as relevant to the burden of proof
analysis adds only one element to those already considered. The court
must weigh the government's interest in maintaining the preponderance
of the evidence standard in cases under the ITSA. The SEC has argued
that because in most of its cases against insider trading it must rely on
circumstantial evidence for proof, a higher standard of proof would be an
undue hardship.222 This argument cannot pass muster. The nature of
the evidence cannot dictate the standard of proof. In many cases in
which the highest standard of proof applies, a criminal conviction rests
solely upon circumstantial evidence. There is no evidence that the SEC's
enforcement program would be impaired by a requirement that cases
under the ITSA be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The analysis above shows that courts should require an intermediate
burden of proof before imposing the ITSA's treble damages penalty.223
220. The SEC might be considered to receive an indirect benefit if imposition of penalties in
general deters future violations.
221. See Wheeler, supra note 204, at 292; see also Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Dam-
ages, 12 HAST. CONT. L.Q. 241, 263 (1985). The SEC can always fulfill its enforcement function by
an action for injunctive relief and disgorgement, in which case the burden of proof will be a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Thus, it has no legitimate interest in the penalty itself. Further, while the
defendant does not have a more significant interest than does the SEC in the outcome of cases in
which injunctive relief and disgorgement are sought, imposition of the penalty alters their relative
positions.
222. See 1984 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 45-46 (memorandum from office of the General
Counsel to SEC Chairman Shad).
223. See Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 1117, 1166-67 (1984) (courts should require at least proof of "clear and convincing evidence"
before assessing punitive damages). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-
91 (1983), in which the Supreme Court rejected the argument that in a private cause of action under
section 10(b) the plaintiff must prove his case by a more than a preponderance of evidence, and
United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1914), in which the Court held that even when the
United States seeks to recover a penalty, only the preponderance of the evidence standard is applica-
ble. Neither case, however, directly governs actions under the ITSA. The issue in Huddleston was
the burden of proof that a private plaintiff must meet under section 10(b); and, generally, punitive
damages have not been available under section 10(b) in actions brought by either a private plaintiff
or the Commission. In Regan, the Court did not consider the possibility of an intermediate burden
of proof, but chose only between the preponderance and the beyond a reasonable doubt standards.
See Regan, 232 U.S. at 40.
There is some indication, however, that the Supreme Court considers a preponderance of the
evidence to be the appropriate standard of proof in any case in which only money is at stake. See
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 387. But see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104-06 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that securities industry professionals should be protected by intermediate but-
*den of proof when the SEC imposes personal sanctions.)
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Such a standard would more appropriately allocate the risk of erroneous
judgments between the SEC and the defendant, and it would reflect soci-
ety's greater concern with imposition of a penalty than with remedies
that merely put the parties near the positions they occupied before they
violated the law. Thus, even though the preponderance of the evidence
standard should apply when the Commission seeks only disgorgement,
the imposition of a penalty changes the balance of the Santosky factors in
favor of a higher standard. Moreover, the higher standard of proof
would mitigate the problem of ambiguity in the law regulating insider
trading by requiring clear evidence that the defendant's conduct encom-
passed each element of a Rule lOb-5 or 14e-3 violation. Finally, the clear
and convincing standard would more certainly indicate the defendant's
guilt of the alleged fraudulent conduct than would the preponderance
standard, and this in turn would help guarantee that the penalty was
reserved for those who were truly culpable and for whom the deterrent
aspect of the ITSA would be appropriate. 24
E. Right to Jury Trial.
Since the ITSA authorizes a penalty for violation of the insider trad-
ing laws, procedural protections should be afforded a defendant in addi-
tion to those granted in cases in which only disgorgement is sought.
Additional procedures are necessary to ensure the guilt of the defendant
before the penalty is assessed because of the defendant's right to avoid
payment of the penalty and the stigma resulting from liability if his con-
duct was not intentionally unlawful. In addition to requiring the higher
burden of proof, the Act should guarantee to the defendant the right to a
trial by jury on the issue of liability for the treble damages penalty.
Congress did not specifically provide in the ITSA that a defendant
has a right to demand a jury trial when the SEC seeks the treble damages
penalty.225 The SEC argued against affording the right to a jury trial
during the congressional hearings on the Act. It emphasized that juries
would complicate and lengthen proceedings. 226 These arguments are un-
224. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 65 (comment of Rep. Wirth) ("[Tlhe preponder-
ance of the evidence standard allows both parties to share the risk in roughly equal fashion. Any
other standard expresses a preference for one side's interests."). In the context of imposition of a
penalty, a preference should be expressed for the defendant. See infra notes 278-86 and accompany-
ing text (discussing standard of culpability in an action under ITSA).
225. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 46-47, 97-98, 153, 234, 248-49, 316-17 (discuss-
ing whether constitutional right to jury trial exists under ITSA); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at
16.
226. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 97 (letter from SEC Chairman Shad to Rep. Wirth)
("A statutory right to a jury trial could burden and prolong Commission actions for a penalty and
complicate settlement negotiations. Moreover, the right to a jury trial in penalty actions may inter-
fere with the successful prosecution of Commission injunctive proceedings.").
1007
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
persuasive. The presence of a jury in an action under the ITSA imposes
no greater burden on the SEC than its presence under other statutory
schemes imposes on other enforcing agencies. No court has cited this
sort of burden as a ground for rejecting the defendant's claim to a jury
trial. In fact, the seventh amendment and cases construing it suggest
that the defendant should be entitled to demand a trial by jury in treble
damages actions under the ITSA.2 27
Without an express guarantee in the Act of the right to a jury trial,
the availability of a jury trial is determined by the seventh amendment.
That amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved. ' 228 The key questions in applying the seventh amend-
ment guarantee to an action by the SEC under the ITSA are, first,
whether the action under the ITSA and the substantive provisions of the
1934 Act fall within the meaning of "Suits at common law," and, second,
whether it makes any difference on the issue of the right to a jury trial
that the plaintiff is the government.
The second question is more easily answered. In Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,229 the Supreme
Court specifically left open the issue whether the seventh amendment ap-
plies to government litigation. Nonetheless, many lower court cases have
held that the seventh amendment guarantee applies When the govern-
ment is the plaintiff and seeks to recover a fine or penalty.230 There is no
227. The amount of the penalty need not be determined by the jury. See United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 438 n.28 (2d Cir. 1974).
In cases that present difficult and complex issues of fact and law, as insider trading cases some-
times do, the use of a jury trial has been criticized. See, e.g., Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should
Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570 (1974); Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950
(1970); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial. A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486 (1975).
228. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. In criminal trials the sixth amendment governs the right to a jury
trial. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally Higginbotham, Continuing the
Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REv. 47 (1977); James, Right
to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury
Trials in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachel v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442 (1971); Note, An Exami-
nation of Due Process and Complex Exceptions to the Seventh Amendment: A Constitutional Ap.
proach to the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 134 (1982),
229. 430 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (1977).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (defendant entitled to trial by jury in suit by U.S. to collect withholding and F.I.C.A. taxes
under Internal Revenue Code); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 430 (2d Cir. 1974)
(right to jury trial exists in government suit to collect civil penalties under Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act); United States v. ACB Sales & Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561, 569 (D. Ariz. 1984) (action
for civil penalties under Federal Trade Commission Act includes right to trial by jury); Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266, 1278, 1286 (D.N.J. 1981)
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apparent reason for denying the seventh amendment guarantee simply
because of the identity of the plaintiff. Therefore, until the Supreme
Court decides otherwise, it must be assumed that the mere presence of
the government as the plaintiff should not itself preclude application of
the seventh amendment.
The harder question is whether an action for a penalty based on a
violation of Rule lOb-5 or 14e-3 is subject to the seventh amendment
right to a jury trial as a "Suit at common law":
The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradis-
tinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence ....
By common law, [the Framers of the Amendment] meant . . .not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and set-
tled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable remedies
were administered. 231
An action for treble damages under the ITSA may also include requests
for injunctive relief or disgorgement, remedies that traditionally have
been administered by courts sitting in equity.232 But the action under the
Act for a penalty resulting from a violation of the law more closely re-
sembles an action to collect a debt, which is clearly legal in nature, than
it does an action in equity.233
The Supreme Court has held that actions to enforce statutory rights
generally are subject to the seventh amendment "if the statute creates
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the
ordinary courts of law.''234 Of course, Congress can choose to authorize
the administrative agency, here, the SEC, to impose the penalty itself; in
(right to trial by jury in action to collect penalties for violation of Atomic Energy Act of 1954);
United States v. Open Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 465 F. Supp. 159, 166 (S.D. Ga. 1979) (in government's
suit for civil penalties under Shipping Act, defendants entitled to jury trial on material factual issues,
including amount of penalty), af'd, 727 F.2d 1061, 1062 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Mosley v. National Fin.
Co., 440 F. Supp. 621, 622 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (private suit for civil penalty under Truth in Lending
Act analogous to suits brought by U.S. to enforce same provision; therefore, right to jury trial
exists).
231. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (emphasis in original) (quoting Parsons v. Bed-
ford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830)).
In arguing that an action to collect civil money penalties must be brought in a U.S. District
Court, Professor Diver writes: "Such an action includes, of course, an opportunity for jury trial of
contested factual issues not foreclosed by a previous binding judgment." Diver, supra note 20, at
1439 (footnote omitted).
232. See Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1946) (holding that action for injunction
and restitution, which is similar to disgorgement, is within court's equity jurisdiction).
233. See generally United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 422-24 (2d Cir. 1974) (statu-
tory penalties have been held to trigger right to jury trial although statute is silent on the issue;
statute can create action that is essentially legal).
234. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (action under section 812 of 1968 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982)).
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that case the administrative adjudication of guilt is not subject to a jury
trial guarantee.235 But in the ITSA, Congress selected the district court
rather than the SEC to impose the penalty. 236
When the district court rather than the agency is assigned the adjudi-
cative responsibility, however, and there is "obviously no functional
justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be avail-
able if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically en-
forced in an action at law."5237
The distinction between an action brought pursuant to the ITSA and any
other case based on statutory rights is that the trial of an action under the
ITSA may require the court to exercise its jurisdiction both in equity and
at law. Consistent with principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
a court's determination of the availability of equitable remedies-injunc-
tion and disgorgement-must follow trial to the jury of the action at law
for penalties under the ITSA.238 But this requirement will not unduly
complicate the case, and thus presents no justification for refusing to ap-
ply the seventh amendment.239
F. Unlimited Payments by the Defendant.
In adopting the ITSA, Congress and the SEC sought to provide an
additional deterrent against violations of the insider trading laws by rais-
235. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977) (Congress may assign factfinding function and initial adjudication to administrative forum
when "public rights" of statutory origin are litigated). But see Kirst, Administrative Penalties and
the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1281
(1978) (criticizing Atlas).
236. See ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
237. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 424 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
238. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) (when actions of equity and law
are joined in the same trial, parties are entitled to jury determination of all legal issues); see also
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962) (legal issues, no matter how incidental to
equitable issues in the same case, must be presented to the jury if properly demanded).
239. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) ("[O]nly under the most
imperative circumstances. . . can the [seventh amendment] right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost
through prior determination of equitable claims."). More generally, the Court has frequently con-
strued the Constitution to compel additional procedural safeguards that protect individual rights,
even though these safeguards also increase administrative burdens and complicate existing proce-
dures. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State of New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (when possible penalty
exceeds sixth months' imprisonment, right of criminal defendant to trial by jury is constitutionally
guaranteed despite administrative inconvenience); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-58 (1968)
(same); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1964) (administrative convenience insuffi-
cient to justify automatic exclusion of women from juries); Schnieder v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 167
(1964) (administrative convenience insufficient to justify statute's automatic deprivation of citizen-
ship for those continuously residing abroad for three or more years). But cf Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (determination of what procedures are sufficient to satisfy due process depends in
part on fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards entail).
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ing the stakes for would-be lawbreakers, and the ITSA penalty clearly
will help to accomplish this goal. But an inside trader, like anyone who
violates the law, should be punished only for his "crime," and the pun-
ishment should appropriately reflect the harm done by the illegal act. In
adding an element of deterrence to the existing sanctions for insider trad-
ing, Congress gave no guidance for determining how severe the total pen-
alty imposed on an inside trader should be. Without such guidance, an
inside trader could be penalized too severely, by being subjected to a vari-
ety of actions based on the same wrongful conduct.
240
The ITSA's treble damages penalty is not exclusive.241 Thus, in an
enforcement action, the SEC could seek an injunction against future vio-
lations of the law, disgorgement, and the ITSA treble damages penalty,
in effect forcing a defendant to pay out the profit gained or loss avoided
four times. In addition, for the same conduct the Department of Justice
could prosecute the defendant in a criminal action and obtain on convic-
tion a maximum fine of $100,000.242 Furthermore, if the defendant's
trading violated an obligation owed to private individuals, they could sue
the defendant for compensatory damages under Rule lOb-5 or 14e-3.
243
Thus, a person who violated the insider trading prohibitions might pay
240. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages ill Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611,
612 (1985).
241. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 27-28, 56, 113 n.6, 151-52; supra note 80.
242. The 1934 Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 11 1984).
243. The amount of damages recoverable by private plaintiffs suing under Rule lOb-5 may be
limited in one of two ways: first, by restricting the class of persons entitled to sue, Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (where defendant's trading did not affect the market
price of the securities and thereby induce the plaintiff to buy, only persons who bought or sold the
shares traded by the insider have standing under Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977);
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1981) (duty to disclose or
abstain from trading is owed only to those who trade contemporaneously-with defendant-inside
trader); or, second, by restricting the maximum recovery to the defendant's profits from the illegal
trading, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); State Teachers Retirement Bd.
v. Fluor Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See generally Block & Barton, Insider
Trading-The Need For Legislation, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 350, 357-62 (1983). In the event that the
plaintiffs' damages exceed the defendant's profits, the plaintiffs would receive pro rata shares of the
recovery. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 172. See Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule l0b-5: A
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349, 396 (1984) (criticizing the disgorge-
ment measure of damages as lacking deterrence); Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider
Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 314 (1974) (discussing problems of
applying the proration rule). The disgorgement measure of damages used in Elkind may be greater
than what is recovered in an enforcement action by the Commission. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699
F.2d 47, 52-54 (lst Cir. 1983) (en banc).
Punitive damages generally have not been awarded under Rule lOb-5. Globus v. Law Research
Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). When the act that violates the
federal securities laws also violates state law, courts have awarded punitive damages on the state law
claim. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973).
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out a sum that exceeds five times the profit made or loss avoided on the
illegal trade.244
For several reasons, there should be a limit on the aggregate amount
that a person who violates the insider trading prohibitions has to pay as a
result of the same trading activity. First, fairness justifies some limit on a
defendant's potential liability. The aggregate amount of the penalty im-
posed on a defendant under the ITSA and as a result of criminal prosecu-
tion should fit the crime.2 45 Second, the assessment of unreasonably
large aggregate liability, once publicized, might discourage legitimate but
novel conduct. Finally, unreasonably large aggregate liability unnecessa-
rily emphasizes insider trading as a harmful activity over and above other
equally pernicious conduct.246
One way to limit the aggregate sum for which a defendant is liable
as a result of illegal trading or tipping is to condition imposition of the
ITSA treble damages penalty on a consideration of the judgments result-
ing from other actions premised on the same conduct.2 47 This would
encourage the SEC to consider the existence of other litigation against
the defendant for the same conduct before it instituted an action under
the ITSA. This, in turn, might lead to a more efficient allocation by the
SEC of litigation and enforcement resources among all potential
defendants.
III. Is THE ITSA A CRIMINAL STATUTE IN DISGUISE?
Because the ITSA permits the assessment of a money penalty that
may exceed the criminal fine available in a particular criminal conviction
for violation of the 1934 Act's insider trading prohibitions, the use of
244. An inside trader may pay out five times his profit gained or loss avoided through a combi-
nation of disgorgement (equal to profit or loss), the ITSA penalty (up to three times profit or loss),
damages to private plaintiffs (up to profit or loss), and a criminal penalty of up to $100,000 (likely to
equal or exceed profit or loss). Damages to private litigants, however, are sometimes satisfied out of
a fund created by disgorgement. See, e.g., SEC v. Golcanda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
245. Cf Coffee, supra note 205, at 1158 (discussing the problem of excess deterrence). It is
anomalous that penalties for a civil violation of the 1934 Act can easily exceed the $100,000 maxi-
mum criminal penalty for such violations. 'See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. II 1984) (maximum criminal
penalty); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1938) (penalty imposed under civil
penalty statute was over thirty times maximum criminal fine applicable to same conduct).
246. Problems involving corporate financial disclosure and tender offers may be as serious as
insider trading. See Klein, Outsider Proposes Changes in Insider Trading Bill, Legal Times of Wash-
ington, Dec. 12, 1983 ("lIt is quite questionable whether, as the. . . [ITSA] implies, insider trading
really can be said to be the most heinous securities law violation.").
247. Some civil penalty statutes impose "an upper limit on the amount of penalty per violation
[ . . (or] establish an upper limit on the total civil penalty liability that may be imposed for a related
series of offenses." Diver, supra note 20, at 1441. This could have been done for the ITSA by
placing a ceiling on the entire amount payable by a defendant as a result of his offense.
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civil procedures in cases assessing the treble damages remedy seems
anomalous.248 Is the treble damages penalty really a criminal statute in
disguise, requiring all of the constitutional guarantees afforded in any
criminal proceeding? In light of the issues that the ITSA raises as a civil
sanction, such as the definition of the prohibited activity and the requisite
burden of proof, an interpretation of the statute as imposing a criminal
sanction might lead to more acceptable results.
The traditional analysis of whether a penalty is criminal or civil be-
gins with a great degree of deference to the label chosen by Congress.
249
Courts afford substantial deference to Congress's choice of the civil or
criminal label for a statute in the belief that Congress categorized the
statute as it did after conscious, reasoned consideration of the nature of
the penalty being imposed.
In enacting the ITSA, Congress did not address whether it should
designate the treble damages penalty as a civil rather than a criminal
sanction. It simply presumed the Act was an appropriate civil provision
without analyzing the issue. Congress's oversight is understandable con-
sidering that the ITSA was proposed, debated, and passed for the pur-
pose of providing the SEC with a new weapon in its battle against insider
trading. The SEC could use the sanction provided by the ITSA only if it
was a civil sanction, since criminal prosecutions under the 1934 Act are
not within the jurisdiction of the Commission.250 As a criminal provi-
sion, the ITSA would not assist the SEC's attempts to curb insider trad-
ing without also involving an increased effort on the part of the Justice
Department. Since Congress made no focused inquiry into the character
of the sanction before attaching a civil label to the ITSA, the civil label
should not carry much weight in the consideration of the character of the
statute.
In the absence of a clear enunciation by Congress, the courts have
had difficulty in arriving at a logical analysis of the distinction between
248. But see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 405 (1938), in which the Court held that a
statute providing for a 50% penalty for fraudulent tax evasion was not a criminal statute. There, the
penalty imposed under the civil penalty statute was $364,354.92; for a willful violation of the tax
laws, the maximum criminal fine that could be imposed was $10,000. Id. at 395-96. In contrast, in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965), the Court considered it
significant that forfeiture, the penalty under the civil statute at issue, could result in a greater burden
on the defendant than that which would result from a criminal conviction based on the same con-
duct. See generally Levin, OSHA and the Sixth Amendment: When Is a "Civil" Penalty Criminal in
Effect?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013, 1046-54 (1978).
249. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) ("First, we have set out to determine
whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly
a preference for one label or the other.") (citation omitted).
250. The Department of Justice prosecutes criminal violations of the securities laws. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(l), (2) (1982).
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criminal and civil provisions. In part, the analysis and the answer to the
question of appropriate classification depend on the purpose for which
the question is asked. When the issue is the application of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment or the procedural safeguards of
the sixth amendment, the class of statutes that are labeled criminal and
thus subject to those constitutional guarantees is narrower than when the
issue is the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 251 Even beyond the confusion arising from classification
based on purpose, however, the articulation of the distinguishing charac-
teristics of a criminal sanction has been less than clear.
Case law suggests that the treble damages penalty of the ITSA does
not render the Act a criminal provision for purposes of the double jeop-
ardy clause or the sixth amendment trial protections. When defendants
invoke these constitutional provisions, courts will ignore the legislature's
labeling of a statute as civil only when sanctions under the statute involve
imprisonment or some other substantial loss of liberty. Courts have not
found the risk of loss of money, even with the attendant injury to reputa-
tion, sufficiently serious to reject Congress's choice of a civil enforcement
mechanism for these purposes.252
Still, the ITSA might be considered a "quasi-criminal" statute, in
which case defendants in actions brought by the SEC under the Act
would be entitled to certain limited constitutional protections. 253 Courts
find a statute labeled civil by the legislature to be quasi-criminal if it im-
251. See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Consti-
tutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 382 (1976). Compare United States v. One Assortment of
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (double jeopardy clause does not bar in rem forfeiture pro-
ceeding against firearms after gun owner has been acquitted on criminal charges involving the same
firearms) and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1972) (per
curiam) (acquittal of owner of jewels on criminal charges of willfully and knowingly smuggling
articles into U.S. does not bar later forfeiture proceeding against jewels) with Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1963) (statutory revocation of citizenship held to be a criminal
sanction).
252. See Clark, supra note 251, at 383 (Supreme Court will find statutes with severe sanctions to
be criminal, regardless of legislative label; less severe sanctions, such as loss of money, do not justify
ignoring statutory label). But see Charney, The Needfor Constitutional Protectionsfor Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478, 501-05 (1971) (discussing whether forfeitures are
criminal penalties for purposes of fourth and fifth amendments).
253. Among the constitutional protections that attach as a result of the "quasi-criminal" label
are the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see, e.g., United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971), and the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, see, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974), affid,
525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975); Martarella v. Kelly, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also
Clark, supra note 251, at 414-21; Sales & Cole, supra note 223, at 1118 (labelling punitive damages
"quasi-criminal fines"); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally 111, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1190, 1259-60 (1974).
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poses a punitive sanction. 254 To determine whether the sanction is puni-
tive or remedial, the courts generally analyze the legislature's purpose in
adopting the statute and the effect of the sanction. If a defendant can
show by "the clearest proof" that the purpose or effect of the statute is
punitive, the court will reject the legislatively selected "civil" label.255
Congress clearly expressed its.purpose in adopting the ITSA in the
legislative history of the Act and in the statute itself. The legislative his-
tory demonstrates that Congress enacted the ITSA to increase deterrence
of insider trading.256 During hearings held on the Act, commentators
and members of Congress and of the SEC frequently stressed that the
treble damages penalty was necessary to increase the burdens imposed
for violating the insider trading laws. They believed that the penalty was
necessary to deter would-be violators and punish the defendant.
257
Moreover, the Act itself serves no purpose but to penalize a defendant for
violating the law. Any amount received as a penalty must be paid into
the Treasury; such amounts cannot be used to compensate victims of the
defendant's conduct or to reimburse the SEC for the costs of the enforce-
ment action. Therefore, the statute serves no compensatory purpose.
The effect of the sanction is also clearly punitive. Courts may impose it
even after the defendant has repaid the ill-gotten gains.2 58 The sanction
serves only to punish a violator of the insider trading laws.
Another factor that courts sometimes consider in distinguishing
civil non-punitive sanctions from quasi-criminal punitive ones is whether
a finding of liability stigmatizes the defendant.2 5 9 Although the stigma
254. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971) (forfeiture is
punitive in nature and therefore subject to fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination);
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294-96 (1935) (finding that special excise tax on retail
liquor dealers was in fact a penalty, and on that basis holding tax unenforceable under tenth amend-
ment after repeal of eighteenth amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (same
as Unied States Coin & Currency); see also Clark, supra note 251, at 381.
255. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)); see Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 200, 211-12
(1965) (suggesting that one important characteristic of a criminal law is state's involvement in bring-
ing action against wrongdoer; authors exclude from their definition of "crime" those statutes that
impose only monetary fines.).
256. The ITSA has as its purpose both general and specific deterrence. General deterrence is
aimed at discouraging would-be violators; specific deterrence is concerned with the defendant in a
particular case. On the purpose of the ITSA generally, see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 2-
3 (opening statement of Rep. Wirth).
257. See id. at 27 (statement of SEC Chairman Shad); id. at 12 (statement of Rep. Rinaldo); id.
at 233-34 (statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr., former SEC Chairman).
258. See supra note 196 (citing cases discussing cumulative effects of criminal and civil actions
based on the same conduct).
259. This consideration of stigma, suggested by Clark, supra note 251, at 406-10, is not very
helpful as a distinguishing characteristic. It seems to put the cart before the horse.
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from payment of a monetary fine seems to be less than that which would
result from imprisonment, any penalty indicates fault. Moreover, suc-
cessful enforcement actions against inside traders have been increasingly
publicized. Increased publicity adds to the reputational damage of a de-
fendant found liable for insider trading under the ITSA.2 60
From these considerations, a court could conclude that the ITSA is
a quasi-criminal penalty.2 61 This finding entitles the defendant to certain
protections, such as the protection against self-incrimination of the fifth
No analysis of the nature of a statutory sanction would be complete without consideration of
the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court for resolution of this issue in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). There, the Court reviewed a statute which authorized revocation of
citizenship for draft evasion. Id. at 146-48, 146 n.1. The Court held that the statute was criminal in
nature, and, therefore, revocation of citizenship could not be accomplished without affording the
defendant all of the constitutional protections normally available in criminal prosecutions. Id. at
165-67. In reaching its decision, the Court enumerated seven factors, which, it later declared, are
"neither exhaustive nor dispositive," United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980), to help in an
analysis of the civil or criminal nature of a statute:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribu-
tion and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant
to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
Of these factors, several are relevant to the analysis of the ITSA's penalty of treble damages, but
none is determinative. First, the treble damages penalty does impose an "affirmative disability or
restraint" on persons who have violated the insider trading laws. The ITSA punishes persons found
to have engaged in insider trading because of their illegal conduct. See Grass, supra note 221, at 248-
55 (analyzing what this factor means). The third Kennedy factor, requiring a finding of scienter, is
also relevant to the penal character of the ITSA. The underlying violation of the insider trading laws
is conditioned upon a finding of scienter. See supra note 127. Further, while the statute instructs the
judge in his discretion to set the amount of the penalty by considering all relevant circumstances, it
does not enumerate any circumstances, such as good faith, as meriting particular attention. This
factor, too, indicates that the ITSA imposes a criminal sanction. See Grass, supra note 221, at 274-
75. In addition, operation of the ITSA will further one of the traditional aims of punishment; the
sole purpose for its adoption was to promote deterrence. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying
text. Further, the behavior to which that statute applies is already a crime under section 32 of the
1934 Act, but such conduct also subjects the defendant to civil liability in many instances. Thus, this
factor seems to carry no significant weight either way. See Grass, supra note 221, at 289-96. The
.alternative purpose" issue is not relevant here, because there is no purpose for the treble damages
penalty aside from deterrence. The only conceivable purpose for the ITSA aside from deterrence
would be to compensate the SEC for its expenses in investigating the violation and conducting the
litigation. See Grass, supra note 221, at 300-05. Congress did not, however, indicate that it intended
the ITSA to serve such a compensatory purpose, and if such a goal had been intended, the penalties
recoverable under the ITSA should have been payable to the Commission rather than to the Treas-
ury. See generally Grass, supra note 221 (analyzing each of the Kennedy factors with respect to the
penal nature of punitive damages).
260. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
261. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-84 (1985) (discussing possibility
that an action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c),
is quasi-criminal).
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amendment.2 62 The quasi-criminal label, however, does not require ap-
plication of the trial procedures embodied in the sixth amendment, nor
does it prevent duplicate prosecutions based on the same conduct, as pro-
hibited by the double jeopardy clause.2 63 Thus, the conclusion that the
treble damages penalty is punitive has limited practical significance for a
defendant in an action brought pursuant to the ITSA. It does not require
a standard of proof higher than the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard, nor does it guarantee a right to jury trial or a more definite state-
ment of the boundaries of illegality.264
Even if the ITSA were construed as a criminal statute, doubts exist
whether criminal enforcement is the most effective way to change eco-
nomic behavior, and insider trading in particular. First, criminal sanc-
tions for insider trading clearly provide an ancillary enforcement
mechanism. "[I]mplicit in the legislative scheme [of economic regula-
tions employing criminal sanctions] is the conception of the criminal
sanction as a last resort to be used selectively and discriminatingly when
other sanctions fail. ''265 In addition to the legislative scheme, the fact
that criminal prosecutions are carried out by the Department of Justice
rather than the SEC reinforces their ancillary role. Any increase in en-
forcement efforts by the SEC will not necessarily affect the use of crimi-
nal laws in enforcement. 266 Thus, unless the means of invoking the
criminal process change, use of a criminal sanction will not achieve the
deterrent purpose of the new Act.
Second, there seems to be less public outrage against insider trading
than against other, more traditional forms of criminal conduct. This lack
of public condemnation is due in part to disagreement among lawyers
262. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637-38 (1886).
263. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (double
jeopardy clause does not apply to forfeiture proceedings brought after acquittal on criminal charges
of dealing in firearms without a license); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-51 (1971)
(jury trial not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings, even though punitive in nature); Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (double jeopardy clause does not bar action to recover
penalty for fraudulent avoidance of income tax, brought after defendant was acquitted of criminal
charges of tax evasion); Compton v. United States, 377 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1967) (standard of
proof in forfeiture proceeding is preponderance of the evidence). See generally Comment, The Con-
cept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 290 (1965).
264. The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is governed by the sixth amendment, and the right
does not attach to prosecutions for petty offenses. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970);
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(b), at 826-28 (1984).
265. Kadish, supra note 126, at 424, 426 (general discussion of the use of criminal sanctions as
part of "a considered economic policy").
266. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 70-71
(statement of John Fedders) (predicting that criminal prosecutions may decrease as use of treble
damages penalty increases).
1017
1018 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:960
and business persons over the basic soundness of laws prohibiting insider
trading.267 Especially when the insider trading does not injure any iden-
tifiable person, as is true in most misappropriation cases, the courts are
often reluctant to promote aggressive enforcement of the law through
criminal sanctions. When the proscribed conduct does not incite the
public's moral outrage, one should question whether criminal sanctions
are appropriate.268  Regulation through civil enforcement mechanisms
may provide the better answer.269
IV. RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL PENALTIES
The conclusion that the criminal law is not necessarily the appropri-
ate or most efficient method for regulating insider trading brings us back
to the concerns about' the ITSA's effect as a civil sanction.270 These con-
cerns-about the definition of the prohibited conduct, the appropriate
burden of proof, the right to a jury trial, and the total penalty imposed on
a defendant-arise because the treble damages penalty is a dramatic de-
parture from the traditional approach to enforcing the securities laws.
When a penalty is imposed, the interests at stake between the enforcer
and the defendant differ from those at stake when the remedy merely
restores the pre-violation status. The Commission has no right to the
penalty; in fact, the penalty will not directly benefit the SEC. On the
other hand, the defendant has a legitimate, significant interest in avoiding
payment of the penalty if it would not serve the deterrent purpose of the
ITSA. Moreover, the defendant has a right to protect his reputation
from undeserved injury and himself from the additional liability of a
267. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 1-15, 182 (1966) (in-
sider trading causes no significant injury to corporate investors and is the most appropriate device
for compensating entrepreneurs in large corporations); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 866-72 (1983) (allowing insider trading may benefit firms by induc-
ing managers to behave in less risk-averse manner); Dooley, supra note 20, at 3, 47-55 (insider trad-
ing regulation only justified if investors are primary beneficiaries of the regulation); Manne,
Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRAN-
SITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (N.Y.U. C. Bus. & Pub,
Admin. 1974); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 588-89
(1970) (arguing against prohibition of insider trading); cf Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and
Dirks "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517, 556-58 (1982) (arguing that it is
economically sound to prohibit use of nonpublic "market" information by investors, but that prohi-
bition on use of inside information should be maintained on basis of moral obligation of fiduciaries to
deal fairly with their beneficiaries).
268. See generally Kadish, supra note 126, at 435-37, who argues that since society tends to treat
"business crimes" lightly, lack of notice that insider trading sanctions were to be strictly applied
would result in unfairness initially. Professor Kadish excludes from his discussion, however, con-
duct that amounts to fraud, which is in fact the basis of an action under Rule lOb-5. See supra notes
100-21 and accompanying text (regarding fraud and the misappropriation theory).
269. See Goldschmid, supra note 44, at 917-18.
270. See supra notes 83-195 and accompanying text.
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treble damages award. It is because of the penalty authorized by the
ITSA, and the resulting interests of the defendant, that greater protec-
tions are warranted.
To ensure that the sanction is used only when appropriate and with
the necessary protections, I propose the following guidelines for applica-
tion of the Act. These guidelines would give notice to the public of
when, why, and to what end the SEC will seek the treble damages pen-
alty, and could be adopted either by Congress as a supplement to the
ITSA or by the Commission pursuant to its ruletiaking authority. The
adoption and publication of these guidelines would serve several func-
tions. First, standards governing when the Commission could invoke the
Act and how large a penalty it could seek would ttduce the transaction
costs of negotiating a settlement of the case. By considering these guide-
lines, the defendant could more easily evaluate the risks of settlement and
trial.271 Second, the SEC would have greater influence over a trial
court's exercise of discretion in fixing the amount of the penalty if the
SEC based the sanction it proposed on a published set of criteria. With-
out a published set of guidelines governing the amount of the penalty, the
court could not easily determine whether the SEC's proposal was based
on ratiohal considerations and was consistent with its treatment of other
defendants in similar cases. 272 Furthermore, soine of the suggested
guidelines would help traders determine in advance whether their con-
duct violated the ITSA. Although the guidelines do not specifically de-
fine insider trading, they do propose a new standard of scienter. Finally,
the establishment of standards for invoking the ITSA and fixing the pen-
alty would facilitate the necessary oversight of the Commission's use of
the sanction by Congress, the courts, and the public.2 73
271. When an agency attempts to compromise a penalty claim-regardlegs of the source of
its authority-it should not permit itself to ignore underlying regulatory objectives; a miti-
gation requested or a compromise offered should be acceptable to the agency only because
payment of that particular sum furthers statutory goals, not simply because the violator is
willing to pay it. Without having first articulated those goals and translated them into
operative standards, the agency can never make that judgment.
Diver, supra note 20, at 1459; see also Note, supra note 31, at 488-89.
272. [B]y establishing standards for assessing or compromising penalties recoverable in a
civil action, the agency may well be able to influence the courts in the exercise of their
penalty-setting discretion. A penalty structure developed and articulated by the agency
responsible for the initiation of enforcement action can make a legitimate claim to at least
some deference by a judge.
Diver, supra note 20, at 1459 (footnote omitted).
273. Id. at 1460 ("Finally, the establishment of standards is necessary to facilitate oversight of
the penalty negotiation process by agency management, the executive, Congress, and the general
public.") (footnote omitted).
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A. When to Invoke the ITSA.
Guidelines should clarify when the SEC would invoke the ITSA in
an enforcement proceeding.2 74 Such guidelines might include a list of
factors that the Commission would consider in deciding whether to seek
the civil penalty. The Commission could consider, for example, whether
the defendant's conduct seriously injured the investing public or, where
the misappropriation theory was invoked, whether the defendant's con-
duct had a significant impact on the market. The existence of an injury
would be one factor weighing in favor of the application of the ITSA.275
The Commission should also consider whether the defendant previously
violated the insider trading or other securities laws. Multiple violations
by a defendant indicate a need for greater deterrence in his case, and the
treble damages penalty would work toward that end.
Another factor the Commission should weigh in deciding whether
to seek the ITSA penalty is the defendant's degree of culpability.
Although liability under the ITSA depends on an underlying violation of
Rule lOb-5 or 14e-3, which require a showing of scienter or reckless-
ness, 2 76 this showing may not demonstrate culpability warranting the
treble damages penalty. It establishes only that the defendant knew the
nonpublic nature of the information and intended to trade on the basis of
it.277 Such proof would not itself constitute sufficient culpability if the
defendant reasonably believed that he was not an insider, did not acquire
the information from an insider, or had no relationship to other investors
sufficient to give rise to the duty to disclose the information or abstain
from trading.
Considering the impact on the defendant of treble damages liability
under the ITSA, perhaps some standard of culpability higher than scien-
ter or recklessness ought to be required before a defendant is penalized
for violating the law. In part, this would help insure against any unfair-
ness that may result from a change in the legal theory underlying insider
trading liability. In addition, it would recognize the quasi-criminal na-
ture of the penalty, in contrast to the civil remedies of disgorgement and
274. The fact that many agencies retain a broad range of charging discretion not subject to
judicial interference does not mean that the agency should not make some effort to struc-
ture that discretion. The choice of which offenses to prosecute can have significant impact
on the fairness and the effectiveness of the regulatory program. For the same reasons that
agencies should set and publicize standards for determining penalty amounts, agencies
should attempt to formulate standards governing the decision to prosecute.
Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted); see also Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (discussing benefits and disadvantages of specificity in rulemaking).
275. But cf infra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing effect that recovery by private
litigants should have on amount of penalty).
276. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 131, 133 and accompanying text.
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compensatory damages.27 8
One might look to the standard of culpability required in a criminal
prosecution for insider trading for guidance here, since the penalty of the
ITSA resembles a criminal fine in some respects. 279 Under section 32 of
the 1934 Act, a criminal conviction for violation of section 10(b) requires
proof that the defendant "willfully" violated the statute.280 The term
"willfully" suggests that something above the traditional scienter re-
quirement in civil actions has to be shown to satisfy the statute. Interest-
ingly, however, courts have interpreted the term "willfully," as used in
section 32, to mean that only ordinary scienter is necessary to support a
criminal conviction.281 In part because section 32 was drafted before sec-
tion 10(b) was interpreted to require a showing of scienter, the courts
have not considered the possible anomaly that the same degree of culpa-
bility applies in both criminal actions under section 32 and civil
actions.282
278. See supra notes 253-64 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 248-69 and accompanying text.
280. Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter. . . shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both;. . . but
no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule
or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added).
281. Although it appears that no courts interpreting section 32(a) have addressed the meaning of
the term "willfully" in that provision, the meaning of the term has been addressed in similar con-
texts. See, e.g., Hinkle Northwest, Inc. v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1981) (action to
review SEC order suspending petitioners from association with any broker-dealer for willfully violat-
ing record-keeping requirement of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act). The court in Hinkle Northwest
inferred willfulness from petitioners' inaction coupled with their expertise in the securities industry.
Id. at 1308; see also Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1980) (appeal from SEC order
censuring petitioner for aiding and abetting violation of section 17(e) of Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1982)). The censure in Decker was imposed pursuant to section
203(e)(5) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1982), which requires a finding
that the person acted willfully before a sanction may be imposed. Id. "The term 'willfully' has been
held in similar contexts to mean merely 'intentionally committing the act which constitutes the
violation. There is no requirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules
or Acts.' Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965)." Decker, 631 F.2d at 1386. Nees v. SEC, 414
F.2d 211, 221 (9th Cir. 1969), reviewed an appeal from an SEC order barring petitioners from asso-
ciation with broker-dealers for willfully violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
section 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act. The Court said that a willful violation meant "only that the act was
a conscious, intentional action." Nees, 414 F.2d at 221. Further support for the conclusion that
willfulness does not require cognizance that the act violates the law is found in section 32(a) itself,
which provides that "no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation
of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis added).
282. The legislative history of section 32 supports the courts' interpretations that the "willful"
standard means no more than scienter-i.e., an intent to deceive. See Hearing of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H.R. 7852, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.
113 (1934), reprinted in 8 I. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURI-
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Of course, the ITSA could be interpreted to require something in
addition to scienter, for example, a showing that the defendant not only
knew the nonpublic nature of the information and intended to trade on
the basis of it-the traditional scienter requirements 283-but also believed
that his conduct was illegal. This requirement would be particularly
helpful in cases involving conduct the illegality of which was unset-
tled.284 Where the boundaries of the prohibited conduct are unclear, the
law should be careful to penalize, by civil or criminal sanctions, only on a
showing that the defendant's conduct has been clearly established by the
courts to be illegal and that the defendant believed the conduct was ille-
gal.2 85 Otherwise, imposition of the penalty does not further the specific
deterrence goal, since the threat of a penalty cannot deter those who do
not and should iRQt be expected to know that their conduct violates the
law.2 86 Thus, to trigger application of the ITSA, the guidelines should
require an element of culpability in addition to those that underlie viola-
tions of the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act.
Finally, the guidelines should provide that the SEC would not in-
voke the ITSA when relying on a novel theory of liability. Unforeseeable
developments in the conceptual underpinnings of the law regulating in-
sider trading should not be used to penalize conduct which previously
was not clearly prq~eribe1. 287
TIES Acr oF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, at 113 (1973); FRIEDMAN, supra note
9, at 83-92 (discussing stak-of-mind requirements for criminal prosecutions in securities cases); Her-
lands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 146-49
(1934) (contrasting willfulness with "willful and knowing" requirement in section 32(a) governing
false filings; author concludes that willfulness means only that defendant realized he was acting in
wrongful manner, and not that defendant was aware of statute or rule that was violated by his
conduct); Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statute.v
The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 956-50, 958
n.339 (1971) (samp).
283. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
284. See Kadish, supra note 126, at 428-29 (allowing defense that the defendant "could not
reasonably" have known that his acts fell within scope of the law would remedy problem of vague,
ness in the substantive prohibition).
285. See United States v. Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1977). Winston reviewed a crimi-
nal action for violation of section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982), which prohib-
its willfully influencing or coercing employees in relation to unionization. In reversing for
prejudicial error in the jury instruction on what satisfies the element of "willfulness," the court said
that willfulness means "the defendant's conduct must constitute a 'voluntary, intentional violation of
a known legal duty.' [United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976)]." Winston, 558 F.2d at
108. The court rejected a jury instruction providing that "the defendants were not required to know
that their conduct violated the Railway Labor Act or any other law." Id. at 107; see also Sales &
Cole, supra note 223, at 1130 n.78 (awards of punitive damages are generally conditioned upon
finding of conscious wrongdoing).
286. See supra notes 157-89 and accompanying text.
287. In the first case in which the ITSA was invoked, the SEC brought an enforcement action
against Federico Ablan, Cesar Duque, and two corporations controlled by Ablan. SEC v. Ablan,
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B. Amount of the Penalty.
Congress left the exact amount of the penalty imposed under the
ITSA to the discretion of the district court.2 88 The SEC proposes an
amount (generally, the maximum),2 89 and the judge must determine
whether that or another sum is appropriate. In exercising this discretion,
the trial judge should consider a number of factors, including, but not
limited to, those discussed below,2 90 which might also properly be con-
sidered by the Commission in deciding how large a penalty to seek.2 91
No. 84-8532 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1985), reported in part in [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP.(CCH) 91,847 (reporting filing of action Nov. 27, 1984); [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,209 (reporting entry of judgment July 23, 1985); see also 16 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1915 (Dec. 7, 1984) (summarizing factual background of case). The Commission
claimed that Ablan and Duque violated Rule lOb-5 by purchasing shares in Monchik-Weber Corp.
based on nonpublic information that Monchik-Weber was going to be acquired by McGraw-Hill.
See 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1915. The information about the acquisition was revealed to
Ablan and Duque by Leonardo Siguion-Reyna, who was introduced to management of Monchik-
Weber by Ablan and who ultimately became a shareholder and director of Monchik-Weber. See id.
at 1916. Ablan and Duque acted as agents for Siguion-Reyna in his discussions with Monchik-
Weber about a Philippine joint venture. See id. Through these discussions and others between
Ablan and Duque and Siguion-Reyna after the latter became a director of Monchik-Weber, Ablan
and Duque were informed of the proposed acquisition by McGraw-Hill. See id.
The SEC based its case against Ablan and Duque on the "temporary insider" theory espoused
in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1915-16. It
argued that Ablan and Duque became temporary insiders when they received word of the proposed
acquisition from Monchik-Weber's chief executive officer, who told them of it to explain its effect on
the proposed Philippine joint venture. See id.
A consent decree was entered in Ablan on July 23, 1985, which ordered Ablan to disgorge
$138,889 and pay a penalty pursuant to the ITSA of $69,737. The penalty equals the profit made by
Ablan on trades executed after the effective date of the ITSA. SEC v. Ablan, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,209 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1985).
The allegations against Ablan and Duque did not present a new or unique theory of liability
under Rule lOb-5. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1915-16; see also SEC v. Gaffney, [1984-
1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) % 92,002 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1985). In Gaffney the
court entered a consent decree in which penalties were imposed under the ITSA for tipping and
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about an impending merger. [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,962. The tipper-insider was required to pay a
penalty even though he did not trade; a penalty was also assessed against the tippee-traders. Id. The
penalty imposed on the tippee-traders amounted to less than the amounts disgorged. Id. The pen-
alty imposed on Gaffney, the tipper-insider, was less than that assessed against either of the tippee-
traders. Id.
288. ITSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
289. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 44; see also Langevoort, supra note 31, at 1278-
79 (suggesting that when defendant is a "sophisticated trader," maximum penalty is appropriate).
290. Cf Diver, supra note 20, at 1501 ("To some extent, high penalty amounts necessarily imply
a greater need to individualize since the higher the potential penalty, the greater the range of poten-
tial motivational impact."). Diver suggests that the following factors should be considered in setting
the amount of the penalty for an individual defendant: ability to pay (i.e., chance of collection),
culpability, and the harm to the public resulting from the defendant's activity. See id. at 1461-72.
See generally Goldschmid, supra note 44, at 946-47.
291. In some cases, it might be most efficient if the SEC sought the maximum penalty under the
ITSA, in order to get the defendant to take the case seriously and answer quickly. Requesting the
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First, and perhaps most important, the court considering an ITSA
penalty should take into account those amounts the defendant is likely to
pay in other actions based on the same conduct. Although Congress did
not prescribe a maximum amount for liability resulting from one or a
series of related transactions violating the insider trading laws, some sort
of maximum penalty, above compensatory damages, is appropriate.292
Other factors relevant to the determination of the amount of the
penalty include the defendant's ability to pay the penalty;293 the effect of
the defendant's conduct on the members of the investing public and on
the market generally; the defendant's culpability; the defendant's prior
securities law violations; and, in certain cases, the existence of public out-
rage over the defendant's conduct. This last factor is significant for de-
fendants who occupy positions of public trust and confidence at the time
they violate the law.294
C. Procedural Protections for the Defendant.
Greater procedural protections should be provided defendants when
a penalty is sought than when only disgorgement or compensatory dam-
ages are at issue. The SEC should be required to prove liability and the
appropriateness of the penalty by clear and convincing evidence,295 and
such liability should not be imposed for challenged conduct that did not
violate previously articulated standards of legality. 296 Further, courts
should reserve the penalty for defendants who violate the law with the
maximum penalty also would put the SEC in a good bargaining position by enabling it to offer a
reduction in the penalty if the case is settled.
On the other hand, initially requesting the maximum penalty may increase the transaction costs
of the settlement process by inducing the defendant to prepare a vigorous defense. See Diver, supra
note 20, at 1483.
292. Cf Diver, supra note 20, at 1440-41.
293. The court should assess the impact of the penalty on the defendant's financial condition; the
penalty should not cause bankruptcy. Cf In re Nelson Ghun & Assocs., 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) % 22,255A at 29,341 (CFTC July 5, 1984) (calculation of civil penalties should take into
account likelihood of collection; "timely collection of civil penalties is as much of a deterrent to
misconduct as their imposition").
294. The cases brought against Thomas Reed, formerly a member of the National Security
Council, for insider trading in Amax options based on nonpublic information about the Amax-Socal
merger illustrate a situation in which the identity and position of the defendant incite public outrage
at his conduct. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 67-70; The SEC's Investigation of
Thomas Reed: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983); see also United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y.) (criminal prosecution), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Reed, 97 F.R.D.
746 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (seller of stock options not entitled to intervene); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (private action arising out of Reed's
trading).
295. See supra notes 190-224 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 97-189 and accompanying text.
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belief that their conduct is illegal, so that only those whose conduct
reaches a high level of culpability would be penalized. 29 7 And, finally,
the defendant should have the right to a trial by jury on the issue of
liability under the ITSA.298 These limitations on the use of the treble
damages penalty would not unduly inhibit the SEC's prosecution of ille-
gitimate conduct, but they would protect from unanticipated conse-
quences those whose conduct does not warrant penalization.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress could have enhanced deterrence against insider trading in
several ways. It could have strengthened the criminal enforcement of
insider trading violations, authorized the SEC to impose administrative
sanctions for such conduct, broadened and specified the conduct to be
prohibited, or authorized additional sanctions for imposition in a civil
enforcement proceeding. Each of these actions would have had some
effect, and a combination of some or all of them would have placed inside
traders on the top of Congress's "most wanted" list. In choosing the last
alternative by adopting the ITSA, Congress sought to add a remedy-a
weapon, as it were-without changing the substantive law defining un-
lawful insider trading. Congress decided to leave the substantive law of
insider trading untouched for many reasons, among which were the de-
sire for quick passage of the ITSA and the difficulty of adjusting the defi-
nition of insider trading in a way that would help enforcement efforts.
The use of a penalty, however, creates problems that were not pres-
ent when the only result of an enforcement action was to restore defend-
ants to the positions they occupied before violating the law. These new
problems arise primarily because the underlying substantive law of in-
sider trading lacks clarity, and because the absence of a definite, bright
line dividing legal from illegal behavior, coupled with the use of a quasi-
criminal sanction, raises concerns about fairness and about protecting
defendants from unwarranted threats and imposition of liability. This
article has sought to develop solutions to these problems by recom-
mending guidelines. These guidelines would be most effective if adopted
by the SEC or Congress. Uniform guidelines would foreclose the possi-
bility that every case brought by the Commission would require a consti-
tutional analysis of the Act. The guidelines are intended to preserve the
Act's goal of deterrence and, at the same time, to protect the interests of
defendants and potential defendants.
297. See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
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